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PREFACE 
Political Science as a Social Science deals with man 
in relation to politics. The prime concern of a student of 
politics must be to make an objective analysis of political 
process with a sense of pragmatism. In this context reference 
may be made to factional politics which have posed serious 
threat to the normal functioning of the political systems, 
especially in the developing socities like ours. I have tried 
in the present study, to probe into the process of political 
factionalism in Orissa from 1975 to 1985. 
The work is spread over six chapters. Chapter I deals 
with an analysis of Orissa in its historical, economic, geog-
raphical, cultural and political setting. The next Chapter 
deals with the hypothetical framework of factional politics 
in general. 
The third Chapter is devoted to a brief account of 
factionalism in the state covering a period of fifty-five 
years (from 1928 to 1975). In Chapter IV analysis of faction-
alism during Mrs. Satpathy's Ministry has been made in detail. 
Factional conflicts during Janata period has been discussed 
and probed in Chapter V, 
The sixth Chapter deals with the return of the Congress 
system and factionalism during J.B. Patnaik's Ministry. This 
Chapter is followed by the concluding chapter which includes 
findings and observations in relation to our hypotheses in 
the Chapter II. 
( Iftekhar Ahemmed ) 
INTRODUCTION 
GRRISA: THE STATE AND ITS PEOPLE 
In the hoary past, the tiny Kingdom of Orissa had 
dazzled the entire sub-continent of Indian peninsula by 
her bold and commendable action, thereby permanently quen-
ching the thirst of sanguinary chanda-Asoka and turning him 
into a venerate Dharcaa-Asoka. It is a land whose tapestic 
culture and history mirrors a "living testimony to the 
speculative daring and artistic sensibility of a race that 
once knew how to live, love and worship and create in heroic 
proportions" . Its dance - the Oddissi - a reflection of 
the aestheticconnoisseurship of the race has been woven 
around the sculptures seen in its temples where; as Tagore 
has succinctly and aptly remarked, "the language of man is 
2 
defeated by the language of stone." 
GEOGRAPHICAL AND ECOLOGICAL PROFILE 
Orissa is situated in the north-eastern section of 
the Indian peninsula. A maritime state with a coast line 
of 482 kilometres along the Bay of Bengal, its precise loca-
tion is between XT'* - 50' and 22® - 34' of North Latitude 
and between 81* - 27' and 89* - 99' east of Greenwich. It 
1. Khanna, H.R.(Justice): "Report of the Commission of 
Enquiry", 1967 Government of Orissa (Home Deptt. 1969) 
p - 810. 
2. Rabindranath Tagore's comment when he visited Konark 
temple. Quoted in the Khanna Commission Report,op.cit.p-807. 
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is bounded in the north by Bihar, in the west by Madhya 
Pradesh and in the south by Andhra Pradesh. The area of 
the state is 155, 707 square kilometres which is slightly 
begger than the total area of England and Wales put to-
gether. Areawise it occupies tenth position among Indian 
states. 67.461 square kilometres of the state is covered 
by forests. 
MORPHOLOGY 
The physical features of Orissa are widely different 
from one part of the state to another. There are alluvial 
plains, wide tracts of arid hills and dense and extensive 
forests. Broadly speaking, the state may be devided into 
four regions (1) Northern plateau (2) The Eastern Ghats, 
(3) The Central tracts and (4) The Coastal plains. The 
territories comprising Orissa come under the last two divi-
sions. The Coastal division covers the districts of 
Balasore, Cuttack, Ganjam and Puri plains which come under 
the category of Eastern Ghats and Coastal regions in the 
All India Physical declaration. The rest of the state may 
be described as Orissa inland division, coming under the 
category of peninsular hills and plateau regions. 
The Coastal plains are the gift of six major rivers, 
which by bringing silt from their catchments, have recl-
aimed this area from the depth of the Bay of Bengal. The 
rivers are the Mahanadi, the Subarnarekha, the Brahmani, 
the Baitarani and the Rushikulya. Thus the Coastal plains 
q 
can be termed as the land of "six deltas". 
The mountainous region of Orissa covers about three-
forth of the area of the state. This region is a part of 
Indian peninsula. Here deep and broad valleys are cut by 
the Mahanadi, Baitarani and Brahmani rivers. The subdued 
4 
plateaus reveal all the peculiarities of peninsular India. 
They are almost flat and monotony of arography is interrup-
ted by the river valleys. These features are commonly met 
within the upper Baitarani and the Sabari basin of the 
Keonjhar and Koraphut districts respectively. 
CLIMATE; 
Orissa enjoys a typical climate. Although rainfall 
is wide spread during the monsoons, some local variations 
are experienced due to orography. Rainfall in Orissa varies 
from a maximum of 191.2 cms. at Bhadrak to only 107.5 cms. 
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at Krishna Prasad in Puri district. In general the Eastern 
Ghats, due to the high relief receive more rainfall than the 
Coastal plains. The late monsoon are primarily cyIonic and 
bring in enough rain to northern Orissa during the months 
of September and October. 
3. Sinha, B.N: The land.and the People of Orissa: Indian 
History Congress Souvenir 1977. Bhubaneswar. (P.O. Deptt, 
of Vani Vihar. Utkal University). 
4. Economic Survay of Orissa 1976. 
5. Tripathy, p.: Orissa Review 1976. 
The mean annual temperature is influenced by its 
latitude, elevation and proximetly to sea. The tempera-
ture rises from 20.5''C in the Coastal plains to 21.4°C 
in the inland areas. Almost the whole of Orissa, with 
some minor exceptions, has got a mean annual temperature 
of 21.4°C to 26.6**C.® 
DEMOGRAPHY 
The population of Orissa, as per 1981 census, is 
262,72,054, ranking eleventh in India. 47.34% of the 
States populations live in the four Coastal districts 
which constitute nearly about 25% of the total area of 
the State, while the hill regions, which covers 75% of 
the area have got only 52.66% of its population. The den-
sity of population is 169 per sq. km. as compared to the 
all India average of 221. The average density of the po-
pulation of the Coastal distric and hill regions is 317 
and 143 respectively. 
Linguistically, Orissa is largely a homogeneous 
state in the sense that nearly 84.11 percent of its in-
habitant speak Oriya. The second largest linguistic mino-
rity - Telgus constitute only 2.28% followed by a host of 
tribal languages. Urdu is spoken by 1.31% while only 0.88% 
speak Hindi. 
6. Tripathy, p.: ibid. 
Orissa has the distinction of having the highest 
percentage of Hindus in its population (96.25%), followed 
by Christians (1.735i) and Muslims (1.49). Inspite of 
such a preponderance of Hindus, communalism is virtually 
non-existent in the state and the state has an impressive 
track-record of communal harmony. 
The literacy rate in Orissa is only 34.22% while 
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the national literacy rate is 37.38%. This low literacy rate 
can be explained in terms of high SC and ST population 
constituting 38.20% of the population. 
Orissa is a state of villages. Nearly 88.18% of 
the population live in 50,806 villages and 11.02 percent 
in 108 towns and four cities of Cuttack, Raurkela, Bhuba-
Q 
neshwar and Barhampur.. The low urbanisation is due to 
the fact that the land is predominantly agricultural. 
Nearly 77.4% pepople are engaged in agriculture. Most of 
them are marginal farmers or landless labour. 
Orissa is a sad symbol of man's ingratitude to nature. 
She presents paradox in plenty. It is very poor in indus-
trial front. 
7. Census of India 1981; Orissa. Series 16, provisional 
population table. 
8. Jena. B.B. opeit. p-11. 
CULTURE 
Orissa is a confluence of two streams of Indian cul-
ture. Orissa's language, culture, art and architecture 
bears incredible marks of Aryavarta (Northern) and Daksh-
inatya (Southern) civilisations. 
Orissa has a very rich and glorious history. The 
people of Kalinga ( as they were known 2000 years ago ) 
were seafaring, making it a prosperous maritime state. 
Till the early part of 19th Century, the Oriya seamen kept 
the maritime flag of the country flying in the waters of 
South East Asia but the Portuguese pirates and enterprising 
British dealt a death blow to the prosperous maritime trade 
of Orissa. In this connection, it may be mentioned that 
ancient Orissa had an overseas empire. 
Through centuries Orissa has been a land of peace 
and religion that have got strong appeal for the Oriya 
people, who are simple Unsophisticated and well-inten-
tioned. Its culture is catholic in out look. The Tantra 
culture of Kamroop, the Dravadian culture of Gandwara and 
the Aryan culture of the South have all gone to evolve the 
cult of Jagannath, the Cult of love and tolerance. 
Orissa culture is often termed as Jagannath culture. 
Oriyas have great faith in and respect for Lord Jagannath ,v*io 
controls and regulates every sphere of life of Orissa -
political, economic, social and spiritual. The religion 
and diety are the product of the mental and spiritual 
development of the people. All religious, social customs 
and cultural activities in Orissa veer around Jagannath. 
He is sovereign, fathere, redeemer of the poor and cosmo-
politan. In short, Orissa Culture means Jagannath and 
the vice versa. 
The Sun-God temple at Konark - known as the Black 
Pagoda - is seven hundred years old and is being regarded 
by experts ( in architect ) as one of the World-class 
classic in perfect architectural design. Rabindranath 
Tagore so commented when he visited it: Konarks is "a 
living testimony to the speculative daring and artistic 
sensibility of a race that once knew how to live, love 
and worship and create in heroic proportions". Where one 
gets feeling that "the language of man is defeated by the 
language of stone". All through the ages Orissa has 
retained a cultural identity much more prominent than her 
political identity, while developing itself within the 
characteristics syndromes of Indian civilization, the Oriyan 
culture nevertheless acquired some distinctive traits of 
its own to enrich that multifaced Indian panorama." 
9. Jena. B.B. - ibid, p-199 
10. Banerjee, R.D: History of Orissa - Vol - VII (Calcutta-
1931). Quoted by Nidakantha Das in the Memorandum to 
Orissa Committee - 1931. 
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POLITICAL BACKGROUND 
With a recorded history of nearly 3000 years, Orissa 
civilization is one of the oldest in India. If we peep in-
to early history of Orissa, we find that the name of Kalinga 
is found in Brahmana Mahabharat composed in circa 1100 B.C. 
refers to Kalinga, Odra, and Utkal. Thus Orissa, comprising 
Utkal, Odra and Kalinga, enjoys long enduring existence, 
since the Puranic ages and it is one of the citadels of 
ancient Indian civilization. 
The East India Company came to Orissa 47 years after 
its conquest of Bengal in 1757. On 14, October 1803 Cuttack 
fell to British army. Balasore and Sambalpur fell to the 
British on 2nd January 1804. After their final defeat at 
Wargaon the Bhonslas of Nagpur signed the treaty of Deogaon 
in 1804 with the British and ceded the province of Cuttack 
including the port and district of Balasore to the East 
India Company. Orissa from then onwards was administered 
from Calcutta in Bengal. 
GROWTH OF POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS 
In Orissa, as elsewhere in 19th Century India, social 
movements as well as the growth of national consciousness 
were facilitated mainly due to two factors; first, the rise 
of a middle-class intelligentia due to the spread of the 
Western education and secondly, the growth of mass-media and 
communication system like press railways and postal ser-
vices etc. The establishment of the English medium 
Schools, Colleges and Universities led to the spread of 
Western ideas and slowly but steadity a new class intelli-
gentia with novel hopes and aspirations appeared on the 
Indian scere. The growth of railways, postal services 
and the press, both native and English provided the re-
quired media for giving necessaey fillip to the growth 
of national consciousness. The report of the Inspectors 
of Schools, South-West Bengal for the year 1957-58 gave 
the following picture. There were three Zilla Schools in 
the head quarters of three districts: Balasore, Cuttack 
and Puri. There was an Angovernacular school at Bhadrak. 
Besides, there were only 16 vernacular schools in the 
12 
wholeprovince. Soon after the femine in 1867, the Govt. 
declared that the Cuttack Zilla School would be raised to 
the status of a 'High School' (Inter College) affiliated 
to the Calcutta University, and on 20th January 1868, the 
13 High School classes were started only with six students. 
11. Patra. K.M. ; 'Orissa under the British' History 
Congress Souvenir 1977. 
12. Op.cit. p 321-22. 
13. Utkal Dipika - Cuttack 25 Jan 1868 (Oriya). 
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FIRST UNITED MOVE 
In April 1903 the Ganjam National Conference was 
held under the auspices of Ganjam Jatiya Samity. In this 
Conference the Oriyas of Ganjam led by the Raja of Khalli-
kote expressed their desire for a united Orissa. Madhusudan 
Das, who was present in the Conference,proposed to convene, 
another Conference on a much bigger scale to press the 
demand. Thus Utkal Sammilani or "Utkal Conference" was 
born in December 1803. "The moment was unique in that it 
embraced all - the high and the low, the literate and the 
illiterate, the official and the non-official - all were 
14 in it," wrote L.M. Patnaik. The Ssimmilani was ushered 
into existence by Madhusudan Das, the "Grand Old man of 
Orissa", and provided a platform where the then princes 
like Krushna Chandra Gajapati Dev, the Maharaja of Para-
lakhemundi, Sreeram Chandra Bhanja Deo, the Maharaja of 
Mayurbhanj and many other aristocrats of the time rubbed 
shoulders with the commeners for the realization of their 
demand - perhaps the earliest demand in India for a homo-
genous linguistic state. 
The first flicker of hope for the fulfillment of 
"this deepest dream and the most potent opirations of the 
14. Patnaik L.M,: Resurrected Orissa. Cuttack 1941. Quoted 
by Ghosh. S. in Orissa in Turmoil - Bhubaneswar 1979. 
p - 12. 
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Oriyas" as Mayadhar Mansingh has put it, spurred acti-
vities in various fields. Gopabandhu Das, who in the 
words of Subhas Chandra Bose, was the "father of national 
movement in Orissa", founded at Sakhigopal, near Purl, 
the Satyabadi open air school, on the model of Deccan 
Education Society of Poona. With the help of his able 
associates like Nilakantha Das, Godavarish Misra, Lingaraj 
Misra, Krupasindh Misra and Harihar Das, all leading inte-
llectuals and educationists of the time, he brought about 
a cultural renaissance in Orrisa. Gopabandhu who is hailed 
as "Utkalamani" (Gem of Utkal), swayed the masses as never 
before by his poetry, prose and oration and his possionate 
feelings poured out through the columns of weekly the SAMAJ 
and the monthly SATYABADI he had founded. 
The school was, for about a decade, the main cul-
tural centre of Orissa. The process, however, was set by 
their forebearers like Gourishankar Roy in whose journal, 
Utkal Dipika, modern Oriya porse began to take shape. Fakir 
Mohan Senapati, Radhanath Roy and Madhusudan Rao - the great 
trio who along with Gangadhar Meher gave a distinct charac-
ter to the modern Oriya language and literature drawing 
on the rich literary heritage left by Sarla DAs, Balaram 
Das, Jagannath Das, Upendra Bhanja, Dinakrushna Das, 
15. Quoted in Ghosh. S. op.cit. p-15. 
12 
Abhimanyu Samanta Singhar, Gopat Krushna Patnaik, Brajanath 
16 
Badajena, Bhim Bhoi, and a host of others. 
IN THE MAINSTREAM 
Soon with the growing Congress influence and rising 
spirit of new nationalism the old structure of the Utkal 
Union Conference Callapsed. Hopefully, and happily, the 
horizon was widened. The struggle for India's freedom 
naturally found its echo in Orissa. Hundreds of students 
including Harekrushna Mahatab, Nabakrushna Chaudhury and 
Jadumoni Mangaraj left schools and colleges without com-
pleting their educaitonal career. 
Gopabandhu Das resigned his membership of Bihar -
Orissa Legislative Council and gave up his legal practice. 
It is at this time that Gopabandhu Chudhury, then a Deputy 
Collector, resigned his job and plunged headlong into the 
freedom struggle. 
Cogress Committees were formed in each district. 
Swaraj Ashram at Cuttack and Alakashram at Jagatsingpur 
became training camps for congress workers. Gopabandhu 
invited Gandhiji in the Nagpur session to visit Orissa 
Gandhiji had accepted the invitation and come to Cuttack on 
March 23, 1921. From Cuttack he trekked to Puri and Barhampur. 
16. Op.cit. p-15. 
13 
It was during this tour that Gandhiji exclaimed", Orissa 
17 is the epitome of India's poverty" and took vow that he 
would not wear a full dhoti till every Indian had got food 
and clothing for himself, a decision which earned him the 
sobrequet of 'Naked Fakir'. By June 1921 about 40,000 
people had enrolled themselves as Congress workers. 
It is exactly during this time that the clarion 
call of non-cooperation movement swept the country. 
C. Rajapalchari and Motilal Nehru visited Orissa in the 
August 1921. The message of the Congress spread like a 
wild fire. Two tenants were killed in the police firing. 
Gopabandhu Das and Bhagirathi Mohapatra were arrested on 
May 31, 1922. While refering to this unprecedented success 
of the movement Subahas Chandra Bose recalled once: "This 
was something new in Orissa and the result of Gopabandhu's 
Courage and sacrifice was to install into the heart of young 
Oriyas a spirit of sacrifice and fearlessness." 
However, the move for a separate Orissa did not 
died down in the nascent nationalistic fever. Ways back 
in the Nagpur Session of 1920, Gopabandhu Das successfully 
persuaded Gandhiji and the Congress to accept the formation 
of linguistic provinces as the congress programme of reorga-
18 
nisation and a resolution was passed to that effect; 
17. Quoted in Ghosh. S. - ibid - p-20 
18. Ghosh. S. op.cit. 
m 
It was in the Round Table Conference, in London in 
January 16th, 1931, the question was again raised and Maha-
raja of Parlakhemundi, K,C,G. Narayan Dev, presented the 
case of Oriyas forcefully. It was recognised that a "sepa-
rate province of Orissa would perhaps be the most homogene-
ous province in the whole of British India both racially 
and linguistically, the communal difficulty is practically 
non-existent and its claim appears to have the support and 
sympathy of all parties in India. 
The White Paper was prepared by the India office on 
the basis of RTC recommendations. The Joint Parliamentary 
Committee which has also gone into the matter enlarged the 
boundaries by including Jeypore and Parlakhemundi: Parliament 
accepted the recommendations of the JPC. Orissa was given 
the independent administrative status as a province under 
the section 289(i)(b) of the Government of India Act, 1935. 
The draft order in the Council constituting Orissa was placed 
before the Parliament on January 21, 1936 under the title 
"The Government of India Order (constitution of Orissa) 1936", 
Thereafter, in February both the Houses of the Parliament 
presented an address to His Majesty praying that an order be 
made. Accordingly, His Majesty passed the Order on March 3, 
19 1936 which came into effect on 1st April, 19367 
19. Ibid, p-24. 
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The province as constituted consisted of six districts 
of Cuttack, Puri, Balasore, Sambalpur, Ganjam and Koraput. 
The province comprised as area of 32,695 square miles with a 
population of 80,43,681. Sir John Austen Hubback was sworn 
in as the First Governor of the Province. The formal inau-
guration was held on April 1, 1936, at a meeting at 
Ravenshaw College, Cuttack amidst unprecedented Jubilation 
of the people. 
POLITICAL AWAKENING IN PRINCEX^ Y STATES 
In Orissa, political awakening in the princely states 
took place as early as in 1931 in consequence of political 
agitation going on in the British Districts adjoining the 
states, in the form of 'Garjat Praja Sammilani'. It remained 
almost dormant till 1936 when Congress took up the causes of 
the people of the states. In 1937, Dr. Pattabhi Sitaramaya, 
one of the organising members of All India States Peoples 
Standing Committee, paid a visit to Orissa, and presided over 
a meeting of Praja Sammilan which was thereafter named as 
21 
Orissa State Peoples Conference. The meeting was held at 
Cuttack on 24 June, 1937. An Enquiry Committee consisting 
of Dr. H.K. Mahatab, Lalmohan Patnaik and Late Balwant Rai 
Mehta ( a member of Servants of the People's Society ) was 
20. Ibid - p-24. 
21. Orissa Review 1952-53 - Orissa on 1937. Ed, Chapter II. 
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constituted in the second meeting of the Conference held 
in June 1938. This Committee conducted its inquiry from 
June 1938 to August 1938. The Committee examined 2000 wit-
nesses in several sittings and published its Report in two 
22 
volumes in 1939. This reports deals exhaustively with 
the maladministration then prevailing in the States and 
contains the evidences given by the people. 
In 1938, the people of some States of Madhya Pradesh 
and Bindhyachal carried on mass agitation against maladmi-
nistration in these states. This news served as a great 
feeder to the prominent workers of Orissa States People 
Conference. Political units known as 'Praja Mandals' were 
formed in many States. Each Praja Mandal prepared its 
•demand sheets' containing the demands of the people like 
civil liberty, responsible government, rationalisation of 
assessment of the revenue and abolition of all illigal taxes, 
23 
and that of contributions like forced labour etc. Thus 
the freedom fight started in the states of Orissa in an or-
ganised manner in the year 1938. 
In the same year, the people of Nilgiri, Dhenkanal, 
Talcher, Ranapur, Gangpur under the leadership of the Praja-
mandal organised agitations which shook the confidence of 
22. Pradhan, P.M. "Liberation Movement in Orissa Review 
1950-51. p-32. 
23. Patnaik, L.M. Op.cit. p-8. 
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the ruler. They roused from their age-long slumber 
and could not be put down by force. They (Princes) had 
to concede to the demands of the people, although partially. 
So temporary peace was established. 
The out break of the Second World War strengthened 
the hands of the rulers by Defence of India Rules. Almost 
all leaders of Prajamandals in the States were arrested. 
This resulted in the temporary lull in the movement. 
Then came the historic "Quit India" Movement of 1942 
which caused an un-precedented upsurge in the country. 
People in some districts like Talcher and Dhenkanal rose 
on rebellion against the State authorities. The movement 
assumed such proportion that the authorities has to resort 
to arial bombing and machine gunning. It was ruthlessly 
supporessed. 
After India gained independence in 1947, the fudatory 
States assumed the attitude of independent soverign states. 
Their rulers neither granted popular government nor were 
willing to merge their States with Orissa. The merging of 
the fudatory States with Orissa has been advocated in the 
report of the Congress States Enquiry Committee in 1929 and 
was no doubt in the minds of some of those who led the pre-
18 
24 
war Prajamandal agitations. But at that time the issue 
seemed remote; it took second place to independence. 
By 1946, with the arrival of the Cabinet Mission,it 
was clear that the British were about to leave and that this 
was the time to stake out claims in the area of power left 
25 
vacant. Dr. Mahatab often pleaded for the merger with 
the Congress leaders. The matter was discussed with Gandhiji 
on 5th April 1946 and on 6th April, with the Cabinet Mission. 
At last Nehru on 10th June agreed in principle with Dr. 
Mahatab that small states particularly Orissa States should 
26 
be amalgamated with the province. 
On the other hand, the people were determined to 
wrest power by force if the Chief did not grant them freedom 
voluntarily. This preparation on the part of the people 
created panic among the Hulling Chiefs who approached Mahatma 
27 Gandhi for solution. Gandhiji referred the matter to 
Sardar Patel who visited Orissa on 13th December, 1947, and 
asked the leaders of Prajamandals to remain restrained. He 
adviced the rulers of the States to merge their States with 
Orissa and warned them about what would happen to them if 
24. Mohanty, K.C., Why Darkness in Orissa? (Orissare Andhara 
Muluka Kahinki?) Oriya Booklet, 1946. 
25. Ibid. 
26. jena. B.B. "Orissa. People, Culture and Polity,(New Delhi 
1980) p-274. 
27. Pradhan. P.M. opcit. p-32. 
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they fail to accept his advice. The Chiefs gave in. Twen-
ty five states including Saraikala and Khaswan, signed the 
Instrixment of Accession on the 14th December 1947, and mer-
ged with Orissa on January 1, 1948. Only Mayurbhanj did 
not joined the other states. However, it signed latter on 
and merged the same day i.e. 1st January 1948, with Orissa. 
Saraikala and Kharswan were transferred to Bihar in May 1948. 
As a result of the merger seven new districts were created 
totaling the number of districts to thirteen. These new 
districts are Bolangir, Phulbari, Dhenkanal, Kalahandi, 
Keonjhar, Mayurbhanj and Sundargarh. 
Dr. Mahatab played a key role in the merger along 
with the 'Iron-man of India*. To quote Patel himself "I 
am happy that I helped him (Mehtab) to realise what was not 
only his dream but the ambition of all Oriyas. I am happier 
still that, it was that backward province, as they call it, 
28 
which led the way for the rest of the India to follow." 
28. Quted in Jena. B.B. op.cit. p-276. 
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TABLE 1: GEOGRAPHIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC FEATURES OF ORISSA 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Name of the 
District 
1 
COASTAL DIST 
Cuttack 
Puri 
Balasore 
GanJ am 
HILL DISTS, 
Mayurbhanj 
Keonjhar 
Dhenkanal 
Phulbani 
Bolangir 
Kalahandi 
Sambalpur 
Sundargarh 
Koraput 
TOTAL: 
( 
Area in 
Sq.km. 
2 
. 40,191 
11,142 
10,182 
6,311 
12,556 
115,516 
10,418 
8,303 
10,827 
11,094 
8,913 
11,772 
17,516 
9,712 
26,961 
1,55,707 
DISTRICT WISE 
Population 
3 
12,435,257 
4,617,748 
2,911,720 
3,253,090 
2,652,699 
13,836,801 
1,576,987 
1,109,746 
1,576,569 
712,772 
1,452,675 
1,329,780 
2,274,125 
1,336,818 
2,467,329 
26,272,058 
) 
Density 
per sq.km. 
4 
317 
414 
286 
357 
211 
143 
151 
134 
146 
64 
163 
113 
130 
138 
92 
169 
Literacy 
Rate in % 
5 
40.91 
45.33 
45.71 
41.84 
30.78 
27.75 
25.47 
29.89 
36.70 
26.61 
25.78 
19.35 
34.02 
36.17 
15.83 
34.21 
SOURCE: Census of India, 1981. Series 16, ORISSA 
(Provisional). 
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CHAPTER - II 
FACTIONALISM 
HYPOTHETICAL FRABIE WORK 
Factionalism is an intra-group hpenomenon. Faction 
refers to a "group with an articulated set of goals, opera-
ting within a larger organisation, but not created by or 
1 
with approval of the parent body". In the context of poli-
tical parties, factionalism refers to the conflict and com-
petition between or among several groups within the party 
to capture its organisation or acquire a dominant position. 
The objective of such conflict is to hold power. One 
faction seeks to over-power the other (or others) so that 
it can dominate party and thereby capture the power at that 
stratum of the ladder where it is located. For example, a 
faction of the Congress party at the state level would seek 
to capture power at the state level while a congress faction 
at the district level would aim at dominating the district 
unit of the party e.g. Zilla Parishad, co-operative Banks 
and district level trade unions affiliated to the congress 
Party. 
Factionalism runs vertically either way. It may 
spread from the top down to the lowest level in the ladder 
and vice versa. A factional conflict at the state level 
1. Wainer, M; Party Politics in India; The Development of 
a Muti-Party System (Princeton, New Jersey,1957) p-237 
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will have its impact felt in the lower level of the party 
organisation as the state level leaders would tend to mo-
bilize resources to win over the lower units at districts 
and village levels. Similarly factionalism may also run 
in the reverse order. A factional showdown at the dis-
trict level may spread to the higher level as the rival 
leaders at the districts will seek the support of the 
state-level leaders. But if there is already a division 
in the party at the higher level, the lower level split 
of the party would mesh in with the higher ups. Thus, 
Dr. Mohapatra points out that "it would be easier for the 
leaders of village factions to gain the alliance of higher 
level leaders who are already placed in charge of rival 
2 
factions". It is thus apparent that factionalism would 
tend to run faster from the top to the bottom than the 
other way round. 
Factionalism has also the inclination to spill over 
horizontally. As the conflicts Intensify, each leader, in 
order to tilt balance of power in favour of his faction 
tries to dominate the sister organisations of the party at 
3 the same level. For instance, a factional conflict in the 
congress party at state level would engulf the state unit 
2. Mohapatra, J.K, Factional Politics in India (Chugh Pub-
lications Allahabad 1985) p-3. 
3. Carras, MarryC, The Dynamics of Indian Political Factions: 
A Study of District Councils in the State of Maharastra 
(Cambridge University Press,Blackie & Son, Bombay 1972)p-185, 
II 
of the INTUC, the party's Lawyers' Association and the 
women front which are important pressure groups within 
the party. 
4 
According to Brass the mam sources of factional-
ism in a political party are power and prestige. No 
doubt, the msot powerful contributing factor for faction-
alism is the lust of power. F^actional leaders consolidate 
their hold over the party organisations by organising 
powerful groups inside the organisations for the sole pur-
pose of gaining the absolute control over party mechanism 
and hence over the government which then will be helpful 
in carving out a place is the sun. Social prestige also 
plays an important role in the formation of a faction as 
Brass cites the examples of Raja of Mankapur, who rebelled 
against the Congress of Gonda district because it gave 
Assembly ticket to a person who was his old rival. However, 
it is the lust of power which is the prime source of fac-
tionalism, for power is the currency which can be used for 
gaining many material benefits both to the faction leader 
as well as his followers, 
Deffering Brass who espouses the predominantly per-
sonal nature of factionalism Mary C. Carras concludes that 
4. Brass, Paul.R., Factional Politics in an Indian State. 
The Congress Party in UP (Oxford University Press, 
Bombay 1966) p-238. 
24 
sometimes ideology do also play a role in the intensifica-
tion of factionalism. "Ideological preferences", she points 
out, "do play a role in political behaviour in so far as 
they are interlinked with considerations of personal inte-
rest". To Carras, however, it is the economic interest 
which bears more weight to the ideology as a determinant 
of factionalism. "Ideology derives its salience when it 
5 
is butterssed by economic interests." 
Heterogeneity and incongruity is another major cause 
of factionalism in the political parties. The "alurement 
of power" compels people from different socio-economic 
groups with different (and even often with diametrically 
opposite) interest to join the dominant political party 
of the time with the hope of gratifying their private in-
terests. Thus, in the process, the party is reduced to 
a 'conflict system' in which different groups compete and 
fight among themselves not only to dominate the party but 
also to perpetuate their dominance by killing each other. 
Ray aptly remarks: "... if the freedom struggle was a power-
ful integrative force within the Congress, the lure of 
power generated several equally powerful divisive forces 
which led to the generation and accentuation of factionalism." 
5. Carras, Marry. C , op. cit. p-185 
6. Ray,R., "Intra^  party conflict in the Bihar Congress" in 
Asian Survey, Berkeley, Vol. VI, 1966 p-707. 
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Factionalism tends to florish more in a single party 
dominant system. The members of a political party would 
tend to be bound by strong ties of unity and solidarity 
in the face of creditable opposition. But their sense of 
one-ness would slacken and they would be inclined to indulge 
in political wrangling in the absence of any formidable 
challenge from outside. This situation further accentuates 
when the party does not adopt or follow a well-defined ideo-
logy on permanent basis. Thus "an organisation here a poli-
tical party - has the propensity to crack within if there 
is no apparent threat from outside. Absence of external 
stress tends to induce internal strain in a party. This 
would largely explain why of all the parties in India the 
7 
Congress has been most affected by factionalism." Thus 
we can hypothesize that the more predominant a political 
party is in a particular state, the more it would be affec-
ted by factionalism and vice-versa. 
Factionalism transcends important socio-political 
Q 
categories. Of course, at the lower rung of the politics 
i.e. village etc., factional alliances are made on primor-
dial lines like cast, and community, but at the higher level 
7. Mohapatra, J.K., Op.cit. p-8, 
8. Sisson, Richard, The Congress Party in Rajasthan, Political 
Integration and Institution-Building in an Indian State 
(University of California Press, Delhi 1972). 
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in the state factions are multi-caste in composition and 
represent different regions{coastal and hilly regions in 
Orissa), language groups etc. 
In factionalism the leader and the followers have 
a cyclic relation i.e. give-and-take relation between them. 
It is a reciprocal relationship, both need each other and 
neither can thrive at the expense of other. Thus Sisson 
observes: "Factional coalitions are contracts of mutual bene-
fits and can be broken by either supporter or supported when 
benefit appears more attractive through an alternative align-
ment, although these coalitions have usually existed over 
g 
a fairly long period of time with marginal adjustments". 
Similarly in the words of Brass "... a factional leader is 
not expected to be an ascetic. The leader is expected to 
try to advance himself in every way possible. The only con-
dition which his supporters will insist upon is that when 
he advances himself, the leader must take his followers with 
him."^° 
Emergence of new and fresh leaders is facilitated 
by factionalism. In the event of circulation of elites 
(through factional fights) the winner-side's not-so-important 
9. Ibid, p-314 
10. Brass, Raul R., Op.cit. p-237 
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or political light-weights get chance to advance themselves 
and turn political heavy-weights. Thus it is seen that many 
such pigmies of the winner faction zoomed into prominent 
positions where as their counterparts of the loser faction 
stripped of their power. In addition to this it would be 
worth noticing that, inspite of defeat, some youth activits 
of loser side also manage to gain prominence and recognition 
by dint of their organisational and fighting capabilities 
demonstrated during the factional combat. 
Factionalism is propitious for new political recruit-
ments. Many new recruitments are made by both sides in order 
to enlarge their support base and increase their control 
over the party organisation. Brass also corroborates this 
fact. Many new elements are not only recruited but also get 
hard and rigorous training under the able guidance of the 
faction leader during the intense factional ordeal. This 
training proves valuable for future roles in more important 
political arenas. Thus factionalism acts as a catalyst for 
vigorous political moblization and also broadens the bases 
of political mobilization and of political participation. 
Factionalism intensifies political communication. 
11. Ibid, p-237 
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The fighting factions, in their frantic bid to win, try to 
convince and cajole high commands as well as the lateral 
groups, thereby causing a political information-flow in a 
big way and also in a criss-cross fashion. 
In developing countries there is a very close link 
between the media of mass communication and the factional-
ism. Factional leaders often deliberately make frendhsip 
with communication elites, especially proprietors, editors 
and columnists of news-papers for the sake of propaganda in 
their favour. Sometimes they themselves launch a newspaper/ 
weekly for the purpose. At the time of factional fight not 
only his newspaper will support his stand, but also vehemen-
tly criticise the views and positions of the rival faction 
and its leader. When the leaders of both the factions have 
direct or indirect linkage with newspapers there ensures a 
headon clash between the two newspapers supporting the rival 
factions. 
It is a well known fact that factionalism is an in-
tra-party phenomenon and factional leaders, in their aim to 
rule the roast, are expected to be within the limits of party 
discipline and should not waver even to the slightest extent 
12. J©na, B.B. and Barala, J.K,, "Oriya Dailies as an Agent 
of Political Communication in the Assembly Election, 
1977 in Indian Journal of Politics (Aligarh) vol.xv 
No.3 1981. p-69-85 
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in their royalty to the party. But time without numbers, 
it has been observed that the warring sides fails to oblige 
by the rules of the game and behave as if they belong to 
two hostile political parties. No wonders the vanquised 
side seldom takes defeat in its own stride. Either side 
put so much stake in the outcome that whoever loses tends 
to prefer to leave the party. This suggest that factional 
13 interest is accorded primacy over the party's interest. 
Factionalism in Orissa - as else where in India 
largely centres around a leader whose personal political 
ambition count exclusively in forming an alliance or orga-
nising a split or defection. Each group in the party will 
have a leader, the chief Minister or his trusted leutenant 
from the ruling faction and the aspirant for the post in 
the rival faction. These groups are often called by the 
name of their leader, e.g. Biju Patnaik Group or the Mahtab 
group etc. 
Factions in political parties in Orissa never have 
had a monolithic unity. Through the gradual accretion of 
supporters, most of whom switch allegiances for personal 
reasons, the minority or the dissident faction some times 
becomes a majority or dominant faction. Often it so happens 
13. Brass, Paul. R., op.cit. p-234. 
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that if these peripheral members do not get benefits as ex-
pected by them, or if the leader, after being installed in 
Gaddi, ignores their claim, they either defect to the rival 
faction or out of frustration form a new faction which is 
out to pull their former leader down to dust. Exactly this 
happened in the late fifties in Orissa, when Mahtab succee-
ded and installed himself as the Chief Minister, his trusted 
lieutenants - Biju Patnaik, Biren Mitra and Nilamani Rautray 
who were instrumental in bringing a downfall of N.K. Choudhry 
ministry, hoped for a birth in the Ministry. But they were 
side tracked by their boss. Thus, with the fraustrated hopes 
and blasted emotions three youth leaders formed a faction and 
decided to teach and Mahtab a lesson. And it was due to 
their anti-Mahtab activities that Dr. Mahtab had to resign 
and quit the party a few years latter. 
A quantum rise in the factionalism haralds with it 
the possibility of cross- party alliances (in most cases the 
tacit agreement). For instancei during the first ministry 
of Sri J.B. Patnaik, the minority faction in the state 
Congress (I), led by K.C, Lenka, seemed to work hand in glove 
with the collaboration of the apposition Janta Party to the 
detriments of the rulling faction led by the CM. During 
the first half of 1960s a defeated Dr. Mahtab faction tried 
clandestinely with the help P.S.P. and Swatantra to dethrown 
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the Biju faction, but Dr. Mahtab's bid ended in a failure 
which resulted in his desertion of the party and the forma-
tion of the Jana Congression 1966, 
With the help of above discussion, we can construct 
a typology of the factional dynamics. First is the 'one-
dominant faction system", in which factions other than the 
dominant one are pigmies pure""ahd":simple and act as powns 
in the chess board of state politics. The second one is 
the 'bi-factional' system whose main characteristics is the 
existence of more or less two equally powerful factions vying 
for the power often each at the cost of other. It corres-
ponds exactly to the "two-person zero-svim game" of the Games 
Theory where the loss of one is the gain of the adversary. 
The third type of factional conflict is the 'amorphous' 
factional system. In such a system there exist more than 
two factions and none is decisively powerful to the others. 
Such a system is characterised by a high degree of fluidity 
and uncertainly. Actors often changes side there by altering 
the balance frequently. We may call it a"n-person zero-sum 
game" in the language of the Games theory. 
To sum up the above discussion it can be said that 
factionalism is an intra-group phenomana whose main causes 
are the personal or caste prestige, economic benefits per-
sonal gain and views. And beneth the exterior of all these 
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factors lies a strong and passionate desire to acquire power. 
It has a multi-dimensional flow i.e. horizontal, vertical 
and in criss-cross fashions (even sometimes transcending 
the boundary of the party itself). Factionalism increases 
political recruitment and encourages youth leadership. It 
also to some extent trains or socializes the new recruits. 
Factional groups have a reciprocal relationship between its 
leaders and the lead. Factional conflicts have its marked 
impact felt in the fabric of the polity e.g. to administra-
tion, the media and the minds of the voters. 
METHODOLOGY 
As regards the methodology I have pursued a combine 
of descriptive (Historical) and empirical method. One source 
of data collection is the published materials in the library 
a vital portion of which is the newspaper clippings.The 
second is the official publications of the state government 
such as election statistics, official reports etc. And the 
last but not the least, is the data gathered on the basis 
of personal interview and questionnaire which cover a cross-
section of the political as well as non-political community 
ranging from the Ex. Chief Ministers, Office bearers of the 
party and other highly respected political observers and 
political scientists down to the ordinary party workers and 
voters in the villages. 
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CHAPTER - III 
FACTIONALISM - A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
The genesis of factionalism in Orissa dates back 
to the fagend of twenties of the present country. On 17th 
of June, 1928 Gopabandhu Das ~ known as Utkalamani (Gem of 
Utkal) - passed away, ushering in the era of bitter faction-
alism. There is no denying the fact that there was no group 
conflict during or under the leadership of Gopabandhu Das 
in the Congress party, but the gorup rivalry mostly lay 
hidden under the surface due to the leadership of his tower-
ing personality. Inspite of his having affinity with Stya-
badi group, the other side did not dare defy him. But no 
sooner did he pass away than the group conflicts in the 
party became public and neither side was prepared to yield 
to the other. Consequently, two factions emerged on the 
scene. One was known as Satyabadi group having its main 
bastion at Puri and the other anti-Satyabadi group was based 
in Cuttack. The dichotomy was clearly on caste lines. 
Whereas the Satyabadi group was dominated by Brahmins the 
Karans and Kshyatriyas (including Khandayats) dominated the 
other anti-Satyabadi group. Thus Lalmohan Patnaik wrote: 
" Misunderstanding grew. Puri being 
the stronghold of Brahmins and Cuttack of 
Karans their differences quitely ushered 
in the noxious Brahman - Karan problem. 
Gradually, it develop into a merace to the 
society." 
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Similarly, Sunit Gosh writes, "In passing, casteism 
in Orissa politics was manifest in the twenties when a 
group of non-Brahmin Congress workers mainly belonging to 
Cuttack and Balasore districts had set up a new political 
centre named Alakashram at Jagatsinghpur in Cuttack district 
which was a rival to the Satyabadi group of Brahmin politi-
1 
cians led by Gopabandhu Das." Thus, casteism was a power-
ful feature of factionalism even during the pre-independence 
days. Among the important members of Satyabadi group were 
Nilakntha Das, Godavarish Mishra, Lingaraj Mishra, Krupasi-
ndhu Mishra, and Harihar Das all of whom were close colle-
gues of the Gopabandhu Das. The other group included Dr. 
H.K. Mahtab, N.K. Chaudhury, Nityananda Kanungo, Jadumani 
Mangaraj, and Raja Krishna Bose who belong to Balasore and 
2 
Cuttack districts. 
As a result of the birth of the new province of 
Orissa on 1st April 1936, Orissa politics gained its sepa-
rate identity. The Orissa Congress decided to participate 
in the election to the state Assembly as per AICC decision. 
But the very thought of contesting against the combined 
strength of resourceful Zamindars sent shivers down the 
1. Ghosh, S: Orissa in Turmoil: Bookland International, 
Bhubneshwar 1979 p-21-22. 
2. Interview with an old social worker, D. Ali on 26.12.88 
at Jagatsinghpur. 
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spine of many congressmen. At this critical juncture the 
young Kishan Sabha leaders came to the rescue of the Gong-
reess and its leader Nilakantha Das. Nabakrishna Chaudhry 
a leader of Kishan Sabha - was appointed by Nilakntha Das 
as the General Secretary of the UPCC. With an election 
menifesto that promised radical agrarian reforms Das, depend-
ing entirely on the Kishan Sabha leaders, streered the party 
through the first battle of ballot. In the election, out 
of 56 seats to which election were held, Congress contested 
for the 37 seats and captured 36 polling nearly 80% of the 
valid votes. National Party of Rajas and Zamindars secured 
3 
only 13 seats and others secured seven. 
NILKANTHA DAS Ys DR. BiAHTAB 
The Congress Party suffered from factionalism before 
the election process had started. The bitterness between 
Nilakantha Das, the then UPCC Chief, and Dr. Mahtab came 
to the surface when the latter was not granted a meeting 
with Pandit Nehru during his election tour to Orissa. On the 
other hand Das faction poisioned the ears of Nehru against 
Dr. Mahtab. However, after the elections, the issue of 
UPCC Presidentship came to the fore. This provided a golden 
opportunity to Dr. Mahtab and his group to fish in the trouble 
3. Mohapatra, J.K; Factional Politics in India, Allahabad 
1985. p-107 
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waters. Dr. Mahtab came up in a big way to challange the 
leadership of Das. The first trial of strength was over 
PCC election in 1937. Mahtab contested Das for the office 
of the President and defeated him by 13-12 votes. The 
outcome was rather curious. Eye-brows were raised even 
in the Congress Working Committee. To quote Nityananda 
Kanungo, "there were doubts in the Working Committee that 
4 
we had manaeuvered to capture the PCC." 
The defeat of Nilakantha Das was symbolic because 
it marks his steady decline in the politics of the State. 
Soon after that both groups started for a head-on clash in 
the contest for the legislative party leadership. The 
supporters of Das were confident that in the final contest 
their leader will win. But they were all unaware of the 
sly foxes gnawing at the very root of their leader -
Nilakantha Das. It so happened that on the day of election 
of the leader, the C.L.P. had two sessions - one in the 
morning and the other in the evening. The followers of 
Das taken over, so to say, by a supreme complacence about 
the prospect of their leader, did not care to attend the 
mornning session whereas the supporters of Mahtab had subtly 
adopted a party constitution that debarrred a non-member of 
4. Ghosh. S. Op.cit. p-33 
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the Assembly from contesting the CLP leadership - an obvious 
move to eliminate Das from the leadership race. The evening 
meeting ended in a pandemonium as Das's supporters came to 
know about the cunning move of Dr. Mahtab. However, Mahtab 
5 
won his first round in the chequered politics of Orissa. 
Then began the hectic activities and dialogues among 
different factions for an amicable settlement of the issue. 
Finally, Biswanath Das was elected as the leader of the CLP. 
In fact, he enjoyed the unique position of being backed and 
owned by both groups - each seeking to serve its own political 
ends through him. But Biswanath Das was too clever and inte-
lligent for them. 
But Biswanath Das, a pragmatic politician, once chosen 
as leader of the CLP, preferred to lend his ears more to 
Dr. Mahtab. There arose a difference of opinion on the for-
mation of Ministry which was solved after the intervention 
of the High Command, The conflict between Mahtab and Nila-
kantha Das again came to light before the UPCC President 
election of 1938. Dr.Mahtab was again elected as the UPCC 
Chief, much to the chagrin of the rival faction. The anti-
ministerial group, headed by Nilakantha Das, tried to dis-
5. Ibid, p-34 
6. Ibid, p-34 
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credit the ministry and brought allegation against it before 
the Congress High Command. Other notable leaders of this 
factionwere Godabarish Mishra and Dibakar Patnaik. These 
charges were examined by Sardar Patel and Rajendra Prasad and 
found to be baseless upon which Sardar Patel issued severe 
strictures to the Das-Mishra faction. But the yawning gap 
between the two factions gradually came to a breaking point. 
However, on the advice of the Congress Parliamentary 
Board Dr. Mahtab resigned from the Presidentship of the UPCC 
and was succeeded by Gopabandhu Choudhury on April 1938. In 
1939 January election of the UPCC Nilakantha Das and Godavarish 
Mishra were elected as President and Secretary. Factional 
fight between the Ministry of Biswanath Das supported by 
Dr. Mahtab and N.K. Chaudhury and organisational wing of the 
party (UPCC) under Nilakantha Das and Godavarish Mishra was 
intensified.Pandit Nilakantha Das publicity ciriticised the 
Ministry and tried to pass resolution to that effect in the 
UPCC was restrained by the CWC which directed that the UPCC 
could mot take any action against the Legislature party with-
out its permission. 
Meanwhile in 1940 UPCC election Dr. Mahtab's faction 
gained control with the election of R.K. Biswasray who defea-
ted Godavarish Mishra in the contest. From 1940 to 1945 the 
0^ 
UPCC with Biswasray as president and Nabakrushna Choudhury 
as General Secretary, was practically under the thumb of 
7 
Dr. Mahtab. And this was the Waterloo of Das - Mishra 
faction after which both decided to leave the Congress and 
joined hands with the opoosition parties of Orissa. 
DWIBEDY - MAHTAB ESTRANGEMENT 
Political forces in Orissa forged fresh alliances in 
forties, and important outcome of which was the emergence 
of Mahtab as the undiputed leader of the Congress party. 
Nabakrishna Chaudhury dissociated himself from the Congress 
Socialist Party and came closer to Mahtab. 1946 provincial 
Assembly elections were hovering in the offing. Mahtab was 
the obvious choice to take the lead. In March 1946,election 
to Orissa Provincial Assembly was held. Interestingly, 
former Chief Minister, Biswanath Das could not take part in 
the election as he was disqualified for six years from contes-
ting any election. 
The Congress, under the stewardship of Dr. Mahtab,own 47 
seats, followed by Muslim League, communist and independents 
with -yi - and 4 seats respectively. In the afternoon of 23 
g 
April, 1946, the new Ministry headed by Dr. Mahtab was sworn in. 
7. Ibid, p-38 
8. Mahtab, H.K., Sadhanara Pathe, (Oria Autobiography) 
Cuttack - 1972, p-255. 
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The tussle between the 'Young Turks', headed by S.N. 
Dwivedy and the ruling group headed by Mahtab intensified 
over the election of the PPC President in 1946. The former 
set up Malati Chaudhury, wife of Naba Krushna Chaudhury, 
against Biswanath Das who was the candidate of the ruling 
group. Malati Chaudhury defeated Das. As the President 
she appointed Dwivedy as the General Secretary of the Cogress. 
Mahtab was special invittee to the PCC, and Das was also 
g 
persuated to be a member of the Committee. 
Mahtab Ministry was afflicted by internal dissensions 
in the Congress Party of Orissa on some general issues like 
the Construction of Hirakund Dam and the site for new capital 
etc. In July 1948 N,K. Chaudhury and R.K.^  Biswas resigned 
from the Ministry. Naba Krushna Chaudhury had a personal 
bereavement in the suicide of his only son and retired to 
his Angul Ashram. Intrigues started in the party to oust 
Mahtab. Key personality in the move were Gopabandhu Chaudhury 
and Nityananda Kanugo. To break this combine Mahtab tact-
fully included Kanungo in his Cabinet. It was at this time 
that Dr. Mahtab was offered a berth in the Central Cabinet 
after a visit of Prime Minister, Nehru, He saw in this 
offer a great opportunity to get out of the State where the 
situation, not withstanding all his good work, had became 
9, Ghosh, S. op.cit. p-55 
^2 
uncomfortable for him. Summing up the entire development 
Mahtab himself says: 
"When I found the intrigues too hot for me. I mana-
ged to get away to the Centre and placed Naba Babu, who 
was all along a progressive, to fight the battle. I thought 
xt was a great manoeuvre". 
Dr. Mahtab succeeded in installing his man as the 
Chief Minister inspite of sharp reaction of the Legislature 
party against Chaudhury who had virtually retired from 
politics since July'48 and was working as a teacher at Angul. 
Thus on 12 May 1950 Chaudhury became the Chief Minister. It 
seems that Dr. Mahtab sponsored the candidature of N.K. 
Chaudhury with the intension of keeping his hold over Orissa 
Congress from Delhi. He had hoped that Chaudhury would be 
loyal to him. Moreover, Dr, Mahtab might have also calcu-
lated that by making Chaudhury the CM. he could carry favour 
with Nehru who had a special liking for Chaudhury since the 
Congress Socialist Party days, 
THE FIRST GENERAL ELECTION and The Politics of Remote Control; 
After two years of assuming the Chief Ministership 
Chaudhury led his party in the first General Election of 1952 
10. Ibid, p-77 
11. Mohapatra, J.K. op.cit. p-112. 
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For the Congress, the result of the Assembly election was 
dissappointing. Out of 140 seats, Congress was able to 
win only 67 seats. However, Congress with the support of 
independents (who were chiefly former Congressmen) formed 
the Ministry as a reluctant N.K. Chaudhury at the helm of 
affairs. One of the factors attributed to this Congress 
reversal is said to be the fielding of many 'parallel' 
12 
candidates by factional leaders of the party. 
TABLE > I 
1952 ELECTION TO THE ORISSA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
Name of the 
Party 
1 
SEATS 
Contested Won 
2 3 
Valid rate 
in %age 
%of Seats 
4 5 
Congress 130 67 48% 39% 
Socialist 78 10 7% 11% 
Ganatantra Parishad 58 31 22% 20% 
Communists 33 7 5% 5% 
Independents & others.218 25 100% 100% 
TOTAL 517 140 100% 100% 
Mahtab's tenure in the Central Cabinet was brief. 
12. Pradhan, P.M., Muktipathe Sainika (Oriya) Vol. II 
(Cuttack, 1973), p-81. 
^^ 
Nehru was not satisfied with his performance. So he was 
dropped when a new cabinet was formed after 1952 election. 
In 1955 he was appointed as Governor of Bombay. Being 
stripped of power Mahtab found himself in the lurch. 
Living in distant Bombay Mahtab grew apprehensive as Chau-
dhury stabilized his position in the organisation. In 
this he saw the prospect of his opolitical future in Orissa 
being hermetically sealed. For him Bombay Governorship 
was like political exile which actually it was. He was, 
therefore, intently looking for the first opportunity to 
return to his home state. Mahtab wanted Chaudhury to work 
as his dvimmy. But Chaudhury soon developed a personality 
of his own and on many matters refused to toe Mahtab's line. 
Once Dr. Mahtab made up his mind to come back to 
Orissa, he began preparing gorund for the same. His stra-
tegy was to create instability in the state and tension 
for the Chief Minister, In the personal column of his Oriya 
daily (The Parjatantra) Mahtab continued to criticize 
Chaudhury Ministry and also started a tirade against the 
Ministry from public platform in the State forgetting that 
13 he was a Governor. A few young political figures in the 
party, like Blju Patnaik, Biran Mitra, Nilamony Rautray, 
13, Gosh, S., op.cit. p-77 
45 
Dinabandhu Sahu, Banamali Patnaik came in handy. They 
were eager to serve the purpose of Mahtab as theyhad their 
own political axe to grind. All this he did to oust 
Nabakrushna Chaudhury. 
As an administrator Naba Babu was not a great success, 
at least he did not compare well with Mahtab on this score. 
Administrative deficiencies during his tenure gave ample 
opportunity to his opponents to raise a storm against him. 
The failure of the Govt, in handling the devastations caused 
by the unprecedented flood in Mahanadi in 1955, and the 
agitations against the decision of the Govt, of India on 
the state reorganisation commission's recommendations giv-
ing Saraikala and Kharswan to state of Bihar provided issues 
on which Mahtab constantly pinned down the Chaudhury 
Ministry. 
Faced with crises like the disputed economy of the 
state, bitter disaffection of the people and above all divided 
party loyalty, Ghaudhury decided to resign from the Chief 
Ministerhsip. In spite of Nehru's whole hearted support, 
essentially a retiring type Chaudhury intimated the High 
Command about his firm decision to resign and retire from 
the politics. 
The High Command started searching for the successor 
of Chaudhury. Mahtab was the obvious choice. Nehru had to 
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content with Mahtab although willy nilly. On 18 October 
1956. Naba Babu resigned and Mahtab took over on the 
following day. 
FACTIONALISM AFTER SECOND GENERAL ELECTION 
Dr. Mahtab led the congress through the second General 
Election of 1957. But his Calculations went awry. The 
Congress won only 56 seats out of 140 seats in which it con-
tested. Its formidable challenger, Ganatantra Parishad won 
51 seats. 
1957 ELECTION TO ORISSA LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 
Name of 
parties 
Congress 
Ganatantra 
Parishad 
Communist 
P.S.P. 
Independents 
others 
Seats 
Contested 
140 
108 
42 
43 
& 171 
Won 
56 
51 
9 
11 
13 
% of seats 
40% 
37% 
7% 
8% 
8% 
Valid votes 
in %age 
38.21% 
28.37% 
8.93% 
10.39 
13.10% 
The Congress did not fight the election as a united 
house. The anti-Mahtab faction tried its level best to 
sabotage the election coampagn from within. At the same time 
m 
Dr. Mahtab tried to ensure the defeat of a few official 
congress candidates like S.N. Patnaik and P.M. Pradhan 
14 
who had opposed hxs return to Orissa politics. There 
were allegations that Biju Patnaik himself gave funds to 
the P.S.P. leader S.N. Dwivedy to fight the election which 
15 Patnaik admitted latter on 'humanitarian grounds' 
However, when the question of Ministry-making came up Biju 
Patnaik and Biren Mirta did all to secure the support of 
Jharkhan Party, the CPI and others. Thus, manipulating 
an aritifical majority through methods not always eithical, 
the Congress came to power again. But the promised stable 
16 
Government remained a far cry. 
This period was one of the murkiest in Orissa's 
political history - a period that witnessed intense politi-
cking, furious horse - trading, and rampant political currup-
tion - a period which was perhaps excelled by a degree in 
1972-73. It is said that during the budget session the 
•supporters' of the Congress had to be made 'happy' every-
day in cash or kind. The "Ministry showed disproportionate 
tenderness, " to quote F.G. Bailey, "to even the least of 
14. Both leaders alleged this in their interview (cited in 
J.K. Mohapatra op.cit. p-135). 
15. Ghosh S., op.cit. p-88 
16. Ibid. p-88. 
its supporters. „17 
For Mahtab, housekeeping was not that easy a job 
because of growing tension in the party for which Mahtab 
himself was mainly responsible. The strong Pro-Chaudhury 
group was there to cause much trouble for him. Disenchant-
ment soon grew among some of his trusted lieutenants like 
Biren Mitra and Dtnabandhu Sahu. At this critical juncture 
election to three Rajya Sabha seats were held. The outcome 
was a serious setback for Congress and also for Mahtab. Due 
to cross-voting only one Congress candidate could win. On 
April 24, a cut motion was moved by Harihar Das of CPI. In 
the voting the Government had a hair-breadth escape by a 
majority of only one vote. 
Another threat in the shape of non-confidence motion 
against the Deputy Speaker was hanging like the 'Sword of 
Democles" Heavy odds were loaded against Dr. Mahtab. His 
ministry was stormed as if it were another Bastille. A 
few days later Mahtab thought it fit to resign because of 
the Futility of running the administration with such a 
slender majority. The Central Parliamentary Board of the 
Congress also favoured the resignation moye. Sending his 
17. Bailey. F.G. : Politics and Social Change, Orissa in 1959, 
(University of California Press, Barkeley, 1963). 
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resignation letter on the May, 1958 Mahtab asserted that 
his Ministry still commands majority in the house. The 
move was very clevery initiated. On the other side of the 
fence Singh Deo - the oppositon leader in the House - was 
there to place his claim for a majority support and hence 
his demand that he be called upon to form a new alternative 
Ministry. 
But the Governor, who was in constant touch with 
New Delhi, remained unmoved by Singh Deo's pleading. The 
atmosphere was cleared with the help of the Governor and 
Dr. Mahtab was asked to continue in office as the Chief 
Minister - Govern*s partiality was openly criticised. And 
thus the curtain was wrung down on the fortnight - long 
episode that brought about a political uncertainty in the 
state. But the drama was further to unforld itself sooner 
than soon. 
It was very difficult to run a ministry with such 
a slender majority. Therefore, Mahtab and his leutenant 
Biju Patanaik veered round the idea that a merger of the 
Congress and the Parishad would be in . the best 
interest of the state. As a first step towards the .-merger 
18. Ghosh. S. op.cit. p-102. 
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of the two rival organisation, the idea of coalition gov-
ernment of the Congress and the Parishad was mooted by the 
State Congress leaders. Mahtab and Singh Deo, both prag-
matic politicians, had certainly there own ideas about 
the prospect of such a coalition and the advantage to their 
respective parties through such an arrangement. The AICC 
also approved the Coalition proposal. The coalition 
Ministry came into being on May 22nd, 1959 with Mahtab as 
the Chief Minister and Singh Deo as the finance Minister 
and virtually the number two in the Ministry. Strangely, 
the Coalition government was bedevilled from its very birth 
by an atmosphere suspicion and distrust inside Congress. 
Mahtab was suspicious of Biju's intentions and was jealous 
of his increasing influence with the High Command, especially 
with Nehru. 
The Coalition came into being with many unresolved 
disputes such as question of ratio of ministers in the cabi-
net, inclusion of Mr. H.S. Padhi ( a turn-Coat ) in the 
19 Cabinet etc. All these issues came up within a month of 
the formation of the Cabinet and embittered the relations 
between the Congress and the Parishad. Strong remours were 
afloat that Biju Patnaik was trying to form an alternative 
ministry through horse-trading. Relations between Mahtab 
19. Patnaik, B.K. op.cit. p-103 
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and Singh Deo further deteriorated*Ultimately, Dr. Mahtab 
resigned on Feb. 24th, 1961 and Orissa came under President's 
20 Rule for the first time. 
Rift between Dr. Mahtab and Biju Patnaik, which 
started from the beginning of the Coalition Ministry widened. 
It resulted in the isolation of Mahtab in the course of time. 
The dismal state of affairs of the Congress made Dr.Mahtab 
pessimistic about its future in the mid-term elections of 
1961. The person, who had dominated the organisation for 
three decades, was conspicuous by his aloofness. He did not 
even contest for the State legislature as he was sure that 
the Congress would be beaten hollow in the poll. On the eve 
of poll he told newsmen that "for another ten years the Cong-
21 
ress can not get on without a Coalition." 
There came the 1961 mid-term Assembly Election. Biju 
Patnaik's bubbling political ambition and organisational capa-
city was on the acid test this time. Fortunately he was in 
the commanding positon. During the poll campaign he posed 
himself as peopleschampion—the saviour of Orissa. In fact he 
was riding the high tide of public acclaim during those days. 
The poll outcome was full of surprises. The Congress under 
20. The Samaj, Cuttack, dt. 25.2.1961 (Oriya Daily) 
21. Ghosh, S. op.cit. p-120 
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Biju was not only able to cut a clear mark in the post, 
having successfully capturing 82 seats but also succeeded 
in clipping the wings of some over ambitious rivals such 
as the Ganatantra Parishad, the PSP and the CPI. 
1961 MID-TERM ASSEMBLY ELECTION RESULT 
Party Seats Valid votes% 
43.287o 
22,34% 
11.40% 
7,98% 
15% 
TOTAL 140 100% 
Biju Patnaik and six other ministers took oath of 
office and secrecy on 23rd June, 1961. A compEign of canard 
against Biju and his deputy Biren Mitra, was soon started 
by Mahtab group in-side the party. However, Biju succeeded 
in controlling his detractors by his sheer ability and his 
closeness with Nehru, 
Meanwhile, a qualitative change took place in the 
All India Congress under Kamraj Plan. Although Biju was 
not actually a target of Kamraj PI an ,but-lie volunteered to 
Congress 
Ganatantra Parishad 
P.S.P. 
Communist 
Others 
82 
37 
10 
4 
7 
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step down so that no aspersion was cast on Nehru that the 
plan was meant to get rid of the unwanted. But Biju Pat-
naik had to reconsider his decision because once out of 
office he was out for ever, however he might have tried 
to return to power several times. But he continued to be 
the 'strongman' of Orissa Congress and the 'Kingmaker' of 
Orissa. 
MITRA MINISTRY 1963-65 
Patnaik was succeeded by his lieutenant Biren Mitra, 
the redoubtable 'Dada' (brother) of Cuttack. But his elec-
tion was not unanimous. Pabitra Mohan Pradhan was a clai-
mant for the leadership. He contested but lost in a secret 
ballot. Mitra got 68 votes as against 15 polled by Pradhan. 
The outcome, no doubt, was a foregone conclusion, but the 
contest only proved consolidation of a small but determined 
rival faction in the party. 
TRIPATHY MINISTRY (1965-67) 
On the resignation of Mitra in February 1965, Biju 
Patnaik, regarded as the 'Super Chief Minister' and the 
King-maker of Orissa, installed Sadasiv Tripathy, a senior 
cabijiet Minister in Mitra Ministry and a senior congress 
leader also, as the new chief Minister of Orissa. Pabitra 
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Mohan Pradhan again threw his gauntlet and got 15 votes 
against 66 by Tripathy, Thus Tripathy was sworn in as the 
Chief Minister, incidentally the fifth Chief Minister 
since Independence. 
JANA-CONGRESS 
Encouraged by the exist of Mitra Ministry in which 
they played a prominent role, the dissidents in the party 
decided at a meeting at Ekamra Niwas, the residence of 
Dr. Mahtab, to intensify their agitation against the 'pre-
sent party leadership." Being unsuccessful in their endea-
vour, Mahtab, them a Member of the Parliament, walked out 
of the Congress with his seven trusted lieutenants and 
formed Jana-Congress (in 1966) with Pabitra Mohan Pradhan 
22 
as the President to 'oust Congress from power.' 
The next, development that look place on the eve of 
election was that the ruling party even after defection 
of the dissidents became a pray to factionalism again. One 
group was led by Sadasive Tripathy, the Chief Minister, 
and the other by Biju Patnaik. Sri Tripathy and his group 
appeared to have been aided and supported by the Central 
High Command and the Patnaik group was in full control of 
the organisation and the majority of the legislators at 
the state level. The C.M.'s faction visibly joined the 
22. Ibid. 
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chorus with the opposition in attacking Biju Patnaik lead-
ing to the final show-down when a number of Ministers refu-
sed to comply with the Chief Minister's order. With this 
23 background the voters went to poll on 21st February 1967. 
The General Elections in 1967 came at the peak of 
anti-Congress wave in the country. It suffered revereses 
in several state including Orissa. In the election, both 
to the Assembly and Lok Sabha, the Congress was practically 
routed. Among the prominent Congress leaders who were biten 
to dust were Biju Patnaik, Nilamony Rauprfty,Satyapriya 
Mohanty, and a host of Ministers except that of the CM. 
Mr. Sadasiva Tripathy. After the elections Biju Patnaik 
said that his party's defeat was mainly due to the split in 
the party before the election and internal dessensions within 
the party, and his opinion seemed to contain some element 
of truth. As many as 40 Congressmen, including five sitting 
24 legislators were opposing official candidates. Further,top 
party leaders tried to sabotage the election prospect of a 
25 
few official candidate also. 
23. Jena, B.B.: General Elections in Orissa. Yerma, S.P., 
and Iqbal Narain (ed) Fourth General Election in India. 
Orient Longman, Bombay 1968, p-350. 
24. Ibid, p-150. 
25. Mr. Binayak Acharya in his interview with Dr.Mohapatra 
revealed that Biju Patnaik has tried his best to sabo-
tage the election of the Sadasiva Tripathy, the then 
CM. (Patnaik J.K. in Factional Police India op.cit. p-160. 
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The Swatantra-Jana Congress alliance, having gained 
an absolute majority, formed a coalition Ministry on 8th 
March, 1967 with the Swatantra leader R.N. Singh Deo as the 
CbeiJ Minister and the Jana Congress leader Pabitra Mohan 
Pradhan as the Deputy Chief Minister. Congress became the 
oppisition for the first time in Orissa. 
MRS. SATPATHY YS BIJU 
In spite of Biju's supremacy in Orissa Congress some 
members under the changing circumstances started drifting 
from him. Again during the Crucial 1969 Presidential elec-
tion Biju did a serious miscalculation. It seems that he 
failed to make the right move on the chess-board of politics. 
He threw his full weight behind Sanjiva Reddy, the official 
congress candidate and put strong pressure upon the Congress 
MALs of Orissa to vote for him. But result of the voting 
(Giri got 67, Desmukh 46 arid Reddy 15) in Orissa Assembly 
revealed that a sizable Inumber of legislators voted for 
Giri and hence their support to Mrs. Gandhi. It also indi-
cated that Patnaik's hold over the Orissa Congress was on 
the wane. All his efforts to get a berth in the Congress(R) 
Working Committee ended in a failture. On the other hand 
Mrs. Nandini Satpathy was elevated to that position. Mean-
while a group of 'Young Turks' under the inspiration of 
Mrs Satpathy became very vocal in their criticism of the 
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Patnaik group. In fact, the Congress elements who gathered 
to raise their voice against him rallied round Mrs. Nandini 
Satpathy, a Deputy Minister of Broadcasting at the Centre. 
Other prominent leaders of anti-Biju faction were Baraja 
Mohan Mohanty, and P.K. Bala. 
It was at this critical juncture of Biju's career 
that the election to the Rajya Sabha from Orissa came as 
the last nail in the Coffin. Biju Patnaik made a desperate 
bid to win the Congress nomination and succeeded in rallying 
the entire Orissa Congress legislature party behined him. 
The UPCC recommended his name unanimously to the Central 
Parliamentary Board. Patnaik himself also pleaded with 
27 Mrs. Gandhi for his nomination. But the Prime Minister 
did not change her mind and the Central Parliamentary Board 
rejected the UPCC recommendation and selected Mr. Narayan 
Patra as the Congress Candidate for the election. 
However, the UPCC fielded its own candidate as 
T. Sangama in an open defiance to the Central Parliamentary 
Board. In the election neither Mr. Sangama nor Mr. Patra 
could win. The candidate of Congress (0). B.K. Mohanty won 
the election. Biju Patnaik was directly accused by Congress(R) 
leaders like Binayak Acharya and Banamali Babu of sabotaging 
Patra's election and they demanded disciplinary action against 
him. 
26. Ibid, p-165. 
27. Interview with Mrs. Nandini Satpathy. 
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BIJU QUITS CONGRESS 
Meanwhile, Patnaik was mentally preparing to quit 
the Congress. Biju and his men felt hvimiliated by the High 
Command, which favoured the minority faction. Under the 
circumstances after the Rajya Sabha election, Patnaik has 
two course open to him. He was either to resign or to face 
the disciplinary action by the party which was already under 
process in the aftermath of the Rajya Sabha election. 
Patnaik choose the first option and resigned from the Congress 
Party on 6th April 1970. 
NANDINI'S EMERGENCE 
Towards the fagend of the sixties there arose in 
the political sky of the Orissa a new star - increasingly 
bright and attractive in character, Mrs. Nandini Satpathy 
was launched into the politics in her student days as a com-
munist activist in the Revenshaw College, Cuttack, the pre-
mier educational institution of Orissa. Having failed to 
come up high as a communist, she joined the Congress and 
proved to be a hard working activist. In no time she won 
the favour of the strongman of Orissa Congress, Biju Patnaik, 
who helped her in being elected to Rajya Sabha on the Congress 
ticket. After she went to New Delhi, she prepared her ground 
there for a bigger political career. Being an ex-communist. 
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she established contacts with other Congress leaders who 
had some connection with the CPI in the past. They formed 
an informal pressure group within the Congress and began 
to gather more weight in the organisation as well as in 
29 
the Government. In course of time Mrs. Satpathy was able 
to cultivate with Mrs. Gandhi and gain her confidence. She 
was not only promoted to the post of Minister of State for 
Broadcasting, but also became the main adviser to Mrs.Gandhi 
on Orissa affairs. Mrs. Gandhi who was suspicious of Biju 
since long was looking for an alternative in Orissa to con-
tain him and Mrs Satpathy was propped up by her to cut Biju 
into size. 
At the beginning of 1971, a new political regrouping 
had came into being in the state and mid-term election took 
place in Orissa on 5 March 1971 both for the Assembly and 
the Lok Sabha. The performance of the Congress (R) was 
dismal in spite of the Indira wave. The Party failed to 
secure required majority Ln the assembly mainly because of 
two factors viz (1) the dominant faction led by Biju Patnaik 
had left the Congress (R) in May 1970 weakening it to a con-
siderable extent and (ii) the joining of the Mahtab group in 
29. The most important ex-communist Congress leader who was 
close to the power centre was Mohan Kumar Mangalam whose 
life was cut short due to air crash in July 1973. Among 
other leftists in the Congress is Mr.Chandrajit Yadav, 
S.M. Hashmi and R.K. Ganesh. 
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the Congress (R) created dissention in the rank and file 
of the party. 
No sooner did. Biju faction leave the Congress(R) 
than Dr. Mahtab and his followers except a handful of Jana 
Congress Members led by P.M. Pradhan joined the Congress(R) 
Dr. Mahtab's return to the party was fully engineered by 
Mrs. Satpathy despite the opposition of her allies like 
Binayak Acharya^ S.S. Mohapatra and P.K. Hal. With her 
strong backing Dr. Mahtab, to the chagrin of 'Young Turks', 
was elected as the leader of the party in the legislature. 
This was the beginning of the tension between Mrs. Satpathy 
and Binayak Acharya which culminated in the latters open 
revolt against the former in 1976 which led to her ouster 
from power. During thJs period (i.e. 1971-72) the Congress(R) 
was divided into two factions. One was the Satpathy - Mahtab 
faction and the other was the Young Turks - Acharya faction. 
On April 27, 1971, Dr. Mahtab resigned from the CLP 
leadership and was succeeded by Acharya. 
By this time a four party coalition government was 
formed with Biswanath Das as the Chief Minister. The Coali-
tion partners were the Swatantra, Utkal Congress, Congress(C) 
and the Jharkhand. In the mean time Congress (R) had started 
encourgaing defection in the Utkal Congress and P.S.P. The 
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later decided to merge in the Congress (R) in May 1972 
and in June 1972 six Swatantra MLAs defeated to the 
Congress (R). In the same month the entire Utkal Congress 
minus Biju joined Congress (R). Thus the strength of 
Congress (R) increased to 94. Das Ministry collapsed. The 
leadership issue within the Congress (R) became complicated 
with both Mrs, Acharya and Braja Mohan Mohanty staking the 
claims for the Chief Ministership. But to the surprise of 
many Mrs. Satpathy, an 'outsider' was made the Chief Minister 
by the High Command. She formed the seven-members Ministry 
on 14 June, 1972. However, factionalism took a new dimen-
sion with the formation of Mrs. Satpathy's Ministry. 
In February 1973, a combined front styled as the 
'Pragati Legislative Party' was formed with the members of 
Swatantra Party, six MLAs of ea^stwhile Utkal Congress and 
independents. Biju was elected as the leader of the new 
30 party and of the opposition in the house. 
On 30 February, 1973 when the Assembly was in session, 
the poltiical situation took a sudden turn. 25 members of 
the Congress (R), including two cabinet Ministers defeated 
from the party and joined the Pragati Party. In fact they 
30. Orissa Legislative Assembly's Notification No. 1773 
dated 9.2.1973. 
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had planned to surprise Mrs. Satpathy on 1st March, 1973 
on the floor of Assembly by declaring their decision. But 
Mrs. Satpathy went to the Governer before the Sunrise of 
1st March and submitted her resignation to Mr. B.D. Jatti 
the Governor, and recommended the dissolution of the 
Assembly. By doing this she forestalled the Government's 
sure defeat on the floor of the Assembly and also the 
prospect of Pragati Party coming to power. Thus Orissa 
came under the President's Rule on 3 March 1973, for the 
third time since independence. 
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CHAPTER - IV 
MID TERM ELECTION OF 197^ AND FACTIONALISM IN 
ORISSA 
Mrs. Nandini Satpathy was a political light weight 
before she was appointed as a Deputy Minister at the Centre, 
and came close to Mrs. Gandhi who sent her to Orissa, as 
the Chief Minister in 1972. She continued to rule the state 
slmost upto 1976 when she was virtually sacked from the Chief 
Ministership. This Chapter deals critically with the second 
Satpathy Ministry which came into being after the mid-term 
election to the Assembly in 1974. 
Despite the attempts made by the High Command, 
factional fighting continued unabated in the Congress (R) 
during the first Satpathy Ministry (1972-1973) and after the 
fall of the Ministry. Soon after the fall of 1st Satpathy 
Ministry in March 1973, factionalism in the party took new 
dimensions. An anti-Satpathy move was bear headed by 8 MPs 
viz Banamali Patnaik, Banamali Babu, S.S. Mohapatra, Anadi 
Chandra Das, Swaraswati Pradhan, Binoj Mohanty, Chintamani 
Panigrahi and Arjun Sethi. They met at Bhubaneswar and 
discussed plans to replace Mrs. Satpathy from leadership. 
1. The Statesman, 3 March 1973. 
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They sent a memorandiim to the P.M. and the AICC President 
Mr. Sharma charging that Mrs. Satpathy and the PCC Presi-
dent B.M. Mohanty had failed to keep the Orissa Congress 
2 
united. But Mrs. Satpathy's supporters wanted her to.be 
made the U.P.C.C. (R) Chief in the interest of Unified 
leadership during the crucial pre-election period. However, 
the dissidents, including the *Young Truks' tried to keep 
Mrs. Satpathy out of party presidentship. 
In such circTimastances, with the apparent pressure 
from Mrs. Satpathy the Congress (R) High Command removed 
the UPCC(R) Chief B.M. Mohanty and in his place appointed 
Mrs. Satpathy who became the UPCC (R) President on 26 March 
3 
1973. The infighting in the party became more intense 
slowly after Mrs. Satpathy became UPCC (R) Chief. During 
Mrs. Gandhi's four to Orissa in October 1973, the "Young 
Turks" prepared and presented a memorandiom demanding removal 
of Mrs. Satpathy from the Orissa Congress(R) leadership. 
But the P.M. chided the dissidents and gave clear indication 
4 
of her continued confidence in Mrs. Satpathy. 
Under these circvimstances, the Election Commission 
decided to hold Assembly elections in Orissa in the last 
2. The Prajatantra, 9 March 1973. 
3. Ibid, 27 March 1973 
4. The Amrit Bazar Patrika, 24 October 1973. 
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week of February 1974. The Congress (R) party tickets were 
distributed mainly under Mrs. Satpathy's direction. A few 
of her critics like Trilochan Kanungo and G. Sabar, the two 
5 
sitting MLAs, were denied party tickets. As the offensive 
of the dissident mounted she needed additional sources of 
power to effectively counter it. The ex«-PSP men were back-
ing her. But their support was not enough to help her in 
winning the factional fight in her party as well as is 
winning the forthcoming Assembly election. One logical op-
tion open to her was an alliance with CPI. Being a commu-
nist activist in the past, she had maintained good relations 
with her ex-collegues in the CPI, and she felt that it was 
the time to take their help in tackling her enemies, both 
inside and outside the party. 
But the above said strategy of Mrs. Satpathy was 
not liked by the ex-PSP leaders who were then her allies. 
They feared that CPI leaders, through the planned alliance 
would push them from the centre of power and entrench them-
self there. But she remain firm in her strategy and got 
the approval of the High Command for this. An electoral 
5. The Patriot, 22 Jan. 1974. 
6. Mohapatra, J.K.: Factional Politics in India, Publication 
Allahabad 1985, p. 193. 
66 
adjustment with the CPI was made, although in a few consti-
tuencies the contest between Congress (R) and CPI candidates 
7 
could not be avoided. A large number of Congress (R) disi-
dents (reportedly 46 in number) who did not get tickets con-
tested as independent. 
Against this backdrop election to the 147 members 
Legislative Assembly were held on 22nd and 24th February,1974. 
There was favourable climate for the Congress (R) with the 
Indira wave still swaying. The electoral battle was mainly 
fought between Congress (R) and the Pragati Party. The Cong-
ress (R) emerged as the single majority party with 69 seats 
to its credit and the Pragati Party got 57 seats. The CPI 
bagged 7 seats, CPI(M) three, Socialist Party two, Jana 
Congress one, Jharkhand Party four and independents four. 
1974 MID-
Name of the 
Parties 
Congress 
Congress (0) 
Utkal Congress 
Swatantra 
-TERM ELECTION TO ( 
ASSEMBLY 
Seat 
Contested 
135 
17 
95 
56 
s 
Won 
69 
-
35 
21 
ORISSA LEGISLATIVE 
Valid votes 
% of seats in % 
47 37.44% 
0.51% 
24 26.45% 
13.5% 12.08% 
7. This happened in Aska and Ninapara constituencies. See 
The Hindustan Times, 7 and 8 February 1974. 
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CPI 
CPI (M) 
Socialist 
Jana Congress 
Jharkhand 
Independents 
14 
8 
17 
42 
12 
229 
7 
3 
2 
1 
1 
7 
4.5% 
2.9% 
1.4% 
0.53% 
0,53% 
4.5% 
4.87 
1.11 
1.77 
1.17 
0.60 
13.94 
On 2nd March, 1974 the Orissa Congress (R) Legisla-
ture party unanimously elected Mrs. Satpathy as its leader 
and with the promised support of the CPI she formed her 
second Ministry on 6th March 1974 with the "goodwill, support 
and cooperation from the Prime Minister and the Congress 
g 
High Command." 
Naturally, Mrs. Satpathy was in high spirit as she 
was in complete command of the state party unit and at the 
same time enjoying the unique benefit of full scale patronage 
of Mrs. Gandhi and the High Command. As a result, at the 
meeting of the legislative wing of the party she was autho-
rised to nominate the party's candidates to be the speaker 
and the Deputy Speaker and also to appoint the Chief Whip of 
9 the CLP and the CLP Executive and office bearers. 
8. The Indian Express, 20 Nov. 1976 
9. The Statesman, 18 March, 1974. 
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MRS. SATPATHY - CPI ALLIANCE 
Mrs. Satpathy's CPI connection grew stronger as 
days passed on. The CPI, on the other hand tried to gain 
some influence in the ministry's decision making from with-
out. It happened that CPI leadership had some reservations 
toward B.B. Das and B.M. Mohanty - two stalwarts in the 
state congress (R). It put pressure on Mrs. Satpathy not to 
include these two in the Ministry. But she could not have 
done this as any omission would have spelt a disaster. They 
were opposed to Das as he was against the CPI when he was 
in the PSP. On the other hand Mohanty incurred the wrath 
of the CPI leadership as he was against the electoral under-
standing with them and prompted many independents to contest 
against the CPI candidates, (e.g. in Nimapara constituency). 
However, she took B.B. Das as the Revenue Minister while 
he was claiming the portfolio of Finance and succeeded in 
persuading an unwilling Mohanty to accept the office of the 
speaker. 
But within one year of the Satpathy Ministry, the 
hitherto dormant dissidence once again raised its ugly head 
on account of her dictatorial behaviour and closeness to 
CPI. The latter tried to create rift between Satpathy and 
B.B. Das, the Revenue Minister who had a clean slate in the 
administration and in the floor of the house. Ultimately 
10. The Times of India, 2nd May, 1975. 
11. Ibid. 
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they succeeded in their Machivellian tactics and anihilia-
ted Das. 
The State Congress (R) was divided into two camps 
Pro-CPI headed by the Chief Minister herself and the anti-
CPI headed by Das. The anti-CPI faction pleaded that the 
party should strive to win over some members of opposition 
instead of the CPI which, in their opinion, would be more 
expensive both politically and otherwise. The ex-PSP leader 
were very much critical of the increasing CPI influence in 
the Government. B.B. Das the anti-CPI faction leader was 
12 
supported by many dissatisfied elements in the party. 
B.B. Das, while addressing the meeting of party wor-
kers of Cuttack district alleged that the CPI was trying to 
cause another split in the party. The UPCC general Secre-
tary and ex-PSP leader Nishamani Khuntia came out with an 
open allegation that the CPI was indulging in senseless vio-
lence and alleged that he was manhandled by the CPI workers 
13 
near Paradeep. Mr. Khuntia was the President of the recog-
nised union of Pradeep port and AITUC (Union affiliated to 
the CPI), was trying to build a base there. 
12. The Motherland, 13 May 1975. 
13. The Statesman, 15 Feb. 1975. 
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Moreover, the former PSP members were not the only 
ones to oppose to any more understanding with the CPI.Quite 
a handful of 'original' congressmen especially the young 
ones, were opposed to the CPI and hence joined hand with the 
Das faction. 
On the other hand, the pro-CPI lobby in the Cong-
ress(R) and the CPI leadership tried to cajole Mrs.Satpathy 
to call off the ex. PSP men from their positions both in the 
Govt, and the party. They pined down the ex.PSP leaders like 
S.N. Dwivedy and B.B. Das on the point that they were not loyal 
to the party and were pro—JP who had, by then, started his 
movement against the Congress(R). This charge was beefed up 
because both the leaders had called on JP during his visit to 
14 Orissa in April 1975. This factional duel between the pro-CPI 
and the anti-CPI groups had a manifest impact on the stability 
of the state politics. Talks of change in the UPCC 
presidentship and rumours about a cabinet reshuffle added 
to the uncertainty. Unified leadership of the organisation 
and the government in the person of Mrs. Satpathy was 
resented by many in the rank and file of the party. Former 
UPCC presidents Mr. Binayak Acharya and B.M, Mohanty 
had established precedents by relinquishing one post in 
14. The Sunday Standard (Calcutta), 14 Nov. 1976. 
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similar circviinstaaces. But Mrs. Satpathy continued to be 
the UPCC President since March 1973, after the fall of her 
first Ministry. This perpetualism resulted in raising of 
many eyebrows and a feeling pervaded in the party circle 
that Mrs. Satpathy by holding two posts simultaneously was 
doing justice to neither. Further it was alleged that she 
was trying to convert the organisation as a tool of her 
faction. Many party-men including B.B. Das and B.M. Mohanty 
urged that in keeping with the principle of "one man one post" 
15 Mrs. Satpathy should step down from her party post. 
In the midst of this rising controversy Satpathy rushed 
to New Delhi in the 1st week of May for a discussion with the 
High Command and Mrs. Gandhi. She probably pleaded with them 
to allow her to form a coalition government with the Orissa 
unit of the CPI. But, much to the chagrin of Mrs. Satpathy, 
her proposal was not only turn down by the High Command 
16 but she was compelled to relinquish the post of UPCC Chief. 
SOCIALISTS DROPED 
The yawning gap between Mrs. Satpathy and ex. PSP ele-
ments in the Congress (R) resulted in the former"^ s frantic 
15. The Hindustan Times, 15 May 1975, 
16. The Motherland, 4 May 1975. 
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bid to tighten her grip over the party and to suppress her 
adversaries with iron hand. To attain this, she should 
control not only the UPCC of which she was the President, 
but also the horizontally placed power centres affiliated 
to the Congress(R). Two such organisations were the students' 
Congress and the Workers Union of Paradeep port, affiliated 
to the INTUC. Arun Patnaik, the then President of the 
Students Congress, was replaced by Aswani Guru because he 
was not loyal to her. Nishamani Khuntia, one of the heavy 
weights in the state politics and an ex-PSP happened to con-
trol the Workers Union of Paradeep for long and that was 
his main power base, she manoeuvered to replace him by no 
17 
other than her husband, Debandra Satpathy. This provides 
testimony to our hypothesis that with the intensification of 
factionalism, factional leaders seek theiir allies in sister 
organisations horizontally placed. 
S.N. Dwivedy let loose a series of press statements 
openly criticizing Mrs. Satpathy, Quite naturally, she took 
strong exceptions to these statements and asked B.B. Das to 
publicly condemn Dwivedy and air his absolute loyalty to 
her leadership. Das - a man of morals and principles -
refused to oblige and no wonder he was asked to resign from 
17. The Dhartitri (Oriya Daily from Cuttack), 8 Apr.,1976. 
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the ministry. Thereupon Das tendered his resignation 
on 25th May 1975,"'-^  
At that time, Mrs. Satpathy agreed to lead the 
Indian delegation to the International Women's Convocation 
scheduled to be held in Moscow in the month of June 1975. 
It was stated that during her absence somebody else other 
than Mr. Acharya would remain incharge of the CM. with 
this Acharya, the number two man in the Ministry who was 
nurshing a grudge since her first Ministry, became further 
dissatisfied. He joined hands with the Das-Mohanty faction. 
They used to meet at Mohanty's residence to chalk out their 
anti-Satpathy strategy. A few MLAs also openly criticized 
the removal of Das, On the other hand she tried to legi-
timise her action against Das and Dwivedy by obtaining 37 
signatures of MLAs in support of her action. Armed with 
this docimient, she went to Delhi and briefed the PM and 
the High Command which in term agreed with her decision in 
19 dropping Das from the ministry. 
Towards the end of June 1975 the party was verti-
cally divided into clear-cut factions. Although Das faction 
had no wholehearted support from quite a large niimber of 
MLAs, still then the bossism of Mrs. Satpathy caused hos-
tility among a sizable number of MLAs and they came forward 
to help Das vis-a-vls Mrs. Satpathy. 
18. The Hindu, 26th May 1975. 
19. The Indian Express, 20 Nov. 1976. 
7^ 
However, the imposition of internal Emergency by 
Mrs. Gandhi's government on 25th June 1975, was a blessing 
in disguise for Mrs. Satpathy. She sought to take maximum 
advantage out of it in bottling up her opponents. Aided 
by bureaucrates and the ironcurtain hung around her, most 
of her ministerial colleagues had to wait for days together 
to get an audience with their Chief Minister. A coterie 
sprang up around her mostly consisting of sycophants who 
led her to believe that she was more popular in Orissa even 
20 than Prime Minister. 
Armed to the teeth with various emergency provisions, 
she was quick to suppress, with full vigour, the intra-party 
indiscipline. The dissidents were at the receiving end 
21 
after the imposition of Emergency. Meanwhile, after lying 
dormant during the initial months of Emergency, the dissi-
dents struck again by demanding the removal of the CM from 
UPCC chief's post. The High Command yielded to the comula-
tive pressure and appointed Chintamany Jena, the then Deputy 
Speaker of the Assembly and a Mrs. Satpathy Yesman, as the 
UPCC President. Thus, she got opportunity to weed out the 
unwanted from the party's organisational wing. A new youth 
20. The Indian Express, 20th Nov. 1976. 
21. Mohapatra, J.K., op.cit., p-200. 
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organisation under the banner of National Socialist Corps 
with her son Tathagath as its president was launched to 
build up her image. The Youth Congress leaders who were 
with dissidents alleged that the NSC was a "sena" to tread 
22 
on the neck of Mrs. Satpathy's critics. 
THE SANJAY FACTOR 
The factional conflict in the state congress (R) 
was significantly influenced by a new and emerging indepen-
dent variable in the national politics. This factor which 
influenced the nation political life to a great extent was 
the phenomenal rise of Mr. Sanjay Gandhi as a dominant deci-
sionmaking figure in the Congress. He had certain reserva-
tions towards the ex.- CPI men in the party and the alliance 
of the party with the communists in different levels. He 
was determined to see to it that the CPI elements in the 
party must go root, branch and blossom. This development 
in the centre acted as a detterent force in the factional 
fight in Orissa, and it singularly spell a great danger to 
Mrs. Satpathy, whose rise in politics was due to her ex-rCPI 
background and alliance with the CPI. The anti-Satpathy or 
anti-CPI faction led by J.B. Patnaik in New Delhi took full 
advantage of the anti-CPI proctivity of Sanjay Gandhi. 
22. The Indian Express. 20th Nov. 1976. 
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It was in August 1976 that the Central leadership 
of the Youth Congress thoroughly reorganisedPradesh Youth 
Congress of Orissa, with Rama Chandra Rath, an ex»student 
leader and an advocate at Berhampur as its President, much 
to the chagrin of Mrs. Satpathy who favoured Bipin Das for 
that post. Before this reorganisational move Mr. J.B. 
Patnaik, the then a Union Deputy Minister, suggested Satpathy 
to invite Mr. Sanjay Gandhi, (a Youth leader) to Orissa as 
a state guest. But Mrs. Satpathy turned down the suggestion 
by saying diplomatically that "Sanjay is like her son, and 
she would like to receive him personally and he will be her 
23 personal guest." This seems to have irritated Sanjay Gandhi 
resulting in his wrath towards Mrs. Satpathy. 
Another factor which added fuel to the fire against 
Mrs. Satpathy was her maltreatment with the newly organised 
PYC leaders. The PYC headed by Mr. Rath received stiff 
opposition from Mrs. Satpathy. Even the office bearers of 
24 the new PYC were barred entry into the PCC Bhavan. Mr. J.B. 
Patnaik and some MPs and some odd half a dozen ministers of 
the state including Binayak Acharya, K.C. Leska and the 
Speaker B.M. Mohanty were first to raise the banner of revolt 
against her "hostile attitude" towards the new PYC and her 
23. Interview with Mrs.Satpathy, cited in Mohapatra, op.cit. 
p-201. 
24. The Indian Express, 20th Nov. 1976. 
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patronage to the National Socialist Corps. It seems that 
because of the pressure exerted by the Patnaik—Acharya 
faction, the High Command dissolved the students Congress of 
OK 
Orissa, controlled by the Satpathy faction. 
With a view to supress the dissidents Mrs. Satpathy's 
supporters held a meeting of the Congress legislative party 
in the first week of October X976 and decided to oust B.M. 
Mohanty from the post of Speaker. This was done against 
the advise of senior cabinet minister Mr. Laxman Malick. But 
26 the High Command rebuffed the move. 
Things were moving very fast against Mrs. Satpathy. 
She could read the writing on the wall only after her failure 
to secure the permission of the High Command to reshuffle 
the cabinet. 
From the third week of October 1976, both the faction 
became very active and they camped in Delhi to present their 
view points before the Prime Minister and Sanjay Gandhi. On 
21 October dissidents led by Blnayak Acharya, K.C. Lenka 
met the Prime Minister, Snajay Gandhi, Kamlapati Tripathy and 
V.C. Shukla and explained that they launched a campaign against 
Mrs. Satpathy only when the NSC and the parallel youth orga-
25. The Parajatantra (Oriya Daily) 10 Nov. 1976. 
26. The Indian Express, 20th Nov. 1976. .v.^-;''- '""'"• --^ 
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27 
nisation started opposing the P.Y.C. On the other hand 
a group of Mrs. Satpathy's supporters led by J.N. Das Mohapatra 
the Education Minister met Mrs. Gandhi and apprised her of 
28 the political situation of the state. Later, Mrs.Satpathy 
personally met the Prime Minister and Sanjay Gandhi and re-
quested the latter to see that the name of the Youth Congress 
organisation was not used by anyone in the Congress organisa-
tion for serving personal interest. 
The factional conflict in Orissa was beafed up in 
November when the Chief Minister remarked in a civil reception 
at Baripada in Mayubhanj district that some of her cabinet 
colleagues were trying to oust her from power and thereby 
create poliitical instability in the state. Perturbed by 
this remark a senior cabinet minister Mr. Laxman Mallick 
29 
resigned his post on 12 November 1976. Mrs. Satpathy tried 
to cajole Mr. Mallick, at first, but after being unsuccessful 
to winning over she hurled allegation that Mr. Mallick's 
resignation is motivated politically and smacks his partisan 
attitude. Thus Mr. Mallick joined hands with the dissidents. 
In the Gauhati session of the AICC the Prime Minister 
Mrs. Gandhi said to have remarked, in obvious reference to 
27. The Sundary Standard, 24th Oct., 1976. 
28. Ibid. 
29. The Indian Express, 19th Nov. 1976. 
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Mrs. Satpathy and some other Chief Ministers that some of 
the Chief Ministers were thinking themselves as "Emperors" 
and by creating factions in the party were serving one groups 
interest. Again, Mrs. Satpathy in a major reshuffling of 
her Ministry on 26th November stripped Acharya of his finance 
portfolio and he was demotted to number four from ntimber two 
position in the cabinet. Finance portfolio was given to 
Mr. Jadunath Das Mohapatra, one of the strongest supporters 
of Mrs. Satpathy in the cabinet. Gangadhar Mohapatra, an-
other Satpathy supporter was rewarded by being allotted three 
more portfolios viz, forest fishery and animal husbandry, in 
addition to the two portfolios of food and supply which he 
continued to hold. Five ministers of state, belonging to 
Satpathy faction, promoted to Cabinet rank were Dibyalochan 
Sekhar Deo, Brahmananda Biswal, Somanath Rath, Kripasindhu 
Bhoi and Bhagirathi Gomango. Two outspoken dissidents K.C. 
Lenka and Dr. Benudhar Baliyarshingh were not promoted and 
the former was deprived of his important Industry portfolio 
30 
which was given to a loyalist. The swearing-in-ceremony 
was boycotted by all dissidents - Binayak Acharya, Benudhar 
Baliarsingh, K.C. Lenka, Jagannath Patnaik, Sailen Mohapatra, 
the Chief Whip, Basudev Mohapatra, the CLP Secretary and 
31 B.M. Mohanty, the Speaker. 
30. The Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta), 28th Nov. 1976. 
31. The Sunday Standard, 28th Nov. 1976. 
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Soon after this on 28th November 1976, both dissi-
dents leaders Acharya and Lenka rushed to New Delhi and 
apprised the Prime Minister and others of the political 
situation in the state. They alleged that the Chief Minister 
had violated the Gauhati spirit and was trying a confronta-
tion with the Centre. Quick came the rebuff from the Chief 
Minister and the UPCC Chief Mr. Jena that reshuffling of the 
Ministry did not amount to a confrontation with the Centre. 
However, at this time some prominent leaders like Mr. Chintamani 
Panigrahi (MP) and some PYC leaders informed the High Command 
that Mrs. Satpathy was trying to humiliate those ministers 
32 
who were co-operating with the Youth Congress. 
During this phase of factional conflict the CPI exten-
ded full support to Mrs. Satpathy. Rajeswar Rao, as an all 
India figure in the CPI and the local Communist heavy-weight 
Mr. Lokanath Chaudhury decried dissidents and the "caucus" at 
Delhi which was trying to creat instability in the state. 
They also criticized the modus operandi in selection of the 
Chief Minister's by a 'coterie' in New Delhi. Their statements 
were severely criticized by the dissidents who wanted them not 
to meddle in the Congress's affairs. 
Another sister organisation of the Congress (R) which 
extended full support to Mrs. Satpathy's faction was Orissa 
32. The Indian Express, 1st Dec. 1976. 
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Pradesh Womeu Front. It cried down, in a resolution adopted 
in its meeting on 9th December 1976, the "mean efforts" of 
dissidents to destablize the state. It further asserted its 
"strong and united support" for the leadership of the Prime 
33 Minister as well as that of the Chief Minister. Although 
this women front was practically a defunct one but the rulling 
faction, in a frantic bid to control the fast deteriorating 
situation moblized it to put psychological pressure on the 
High Command and the dissidents. Thus aptly remarks Dr. 
Mohapatra: "The wind was blowing against her and she seemingly 
34 left no stone unturned to reverse the direction of the wind." 
It was exactly during this crucial juncture of the 
factional warfare that the die casted by Mr. J.B. Patnaik, 
the then a minister and a close and loyal associate of Mr.Sanjay 
Gandhi in favour of dissidents heralded doom's day for Mrs. 
Satpathy. During those days he was in Bhubaneswar to chalk 
out final strategy with important dissident leaders after a 
meeting with the Governor he told reporters that "the situation 
in the state could not be corrected unless the Prime Minister 
intervene'.' After having consultation with important dissidents 
like Binayak Acharya, B.M. Mohanty, S.N. Dwivedy, and B.B.Das, 
Patnaik left for Delhi for a brief and the long with Mrs.Gandhi, 
Sanjay Gandhi and other national level leaders. 
33. The Samaj (Oriya Daily from Cuttack) 11 Dec. 1976. 
34. Mohapatra, J.K., op.cit., p-206. 
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The anti-Satpathy campaign gained further fillip with 
the return of J.B. Patnaik to Bhubaneswar on 10 December 1976 
after a day's stormy trip to New Delhi. On that very day, 
eight Ministers and 12 Congress MLAs called on the Governor 
to inform that the Chief Minister had lost the majority sup-
port of the C.L.P. To convince the Governor they submitted 
a memorandum to that effect containing the signature of 47 
and add MLAs. Much harrassment was caused to Mrs. Satpathy 
when she was advised by Sailen Mohapatra, as ex-communistlifee 
her and Basudev Mohapatra, the CLP Secretary to step down. 
Both the leaders also pointed to the Governor that Mrs. 
35 
satpathy's ministry had become unworkable. 
However, ignoring all the pieces of advice Mrs.Satpathy 
hastily rushed to New Delhi on being summoned by the High 
Command. After a long one hour meeting with the Prime Minister 
on 14th December she told reporters that she had left all 
matters with Mrs. Gandhi. She returned on 15 December and 
the next morning she was asked by Kamlapati Tripathy, D.K.Barooah 
37 
and Charnajit Yadav on telephone to resign immediately. She 
informed them that she would resign after attending her official 
engagement at Dhenkanal (her own constitutency) in the evening. 
35. The Times of India, 12 Dec. 1976. 
36. The Times of India, 15 Dec. 1976. 
37. Mrs. Satpathy revealedthis to Dr. Mohapatra in an inter-
view, cited in Dr. Mohapatra's, op.cit. p-207. 
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It was exactly during her address in the meeting that a wire-
less message was received from the High Command dictating her 
to resign. An emotional and thoroughly broken Mrs. Satpathy 
wound up her speech and dashed to Bhubaneswar Raj Bhavan at 
6.23 PM to hand over her resignation to the Governor. Thus 
came to an end the era of one of the most impudent and power-
ful Chief Minister in the political history of Orissa. And 
it was for the fourth time that the President's Rule was 
imposed on Orissa since independence. 
Here is an interesting development to test one of our 
hypothesis regarding the role of the press in the factional 
battle in a state. The hypothesis under verification is that 
when a powerful leader gets involved in the factional warfare, 
he would tend to his advantage. In case of Mrs, Satpathy 
the period from 1974 to 1976 when internal opposition to her 
grew increasingly intensity, she used All India Radio, Cuttack 
to boost her image. Again, the Oriya Daily Dharitri started 
by her in 1974 had not only extended strong support to her 
but also severely attacked her detractors in the party. It 
highlighted the "useful" alliance between the Congress (R) 
with the CPI and launched a firce attack on ex-».PSP elements 
38 
who became hostile to Mrs, Satpathy, Never a day passed 
38. The Dharitri (Bhubaneswar) 20 May 1976. 
when the paper did not contain any magnified column on the 
Chief Minister's achievements and the dissidents' character 
39 
assassination. If one glances through the issues of 
Dharitri of this period (especially of the year 1976) it 
becomes clear that the newspaper took active part in the 
factional battle of the Congress (R) and strongly defended 
its owner - Mrs. Satpathy. 
ACHARYA MINISTRY 
A.R. Antulay, AICC General Secretary incharge of 
Orissa affairs reached Bhubaneswar immediately after Mrs. 
Satpathy's resignation. In a speech to Congress(R) workers 
Antulay criticised atid condemned the concept of "state 
bossism". After that Antulay alongwith Acharya and J.B. 
Patnaik left for New Delhi, For sometimes its appeared that 
there was a competition between Patnaik and Acharya, the 
two architects of Satpathy's downfall. But J.B. Patnaik's 
elevation as a minister of state just at that time provided 
amply testimony to the Prime Minister's desire about Acharya 
to be the new Chief Minister. Thus Binayak Acharya was elec-
ted as the CCP leader and formed the new ministry on 29th 
December 1976 thereby putting an end to a long political 
anarchy in the State. 
39. The Dharitri (Bhubaneswar) 29 Nov. 1976. 
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However, Acharya's term, was the briefest so far in 
Orissa - 123 days only. He had started with a lot of good-
will which he soon spilled by his indecision in certain 
important matters. His close party colleagues, who had 
brought to him to power, soon got disillusioned with him 
while his detractors, who included a number of former 
ministers and pro-Satpathy Congressmen continued to spipe 
at him. Again, the unexpected and stunning success of the 
Janata Party in the General Election of 1977 demoralised 
Congressmen and left them throughly shaken. Erosion fast 
started in the party ranks. A section of Congressmen were 
even willing to join the Janata Party or extend its support, 
to an alternative government that may be formed by the 
Janata Party. It was during this time that 18 Congress MLAs 
including a Minister, A.U. Singh Deo, left the party, leaving 
it to a bare majority of two in the 147 members house. 
Dr. J.K. Mohapatra rightly points out that "Acharya was, 
perhaps, too soft a man to be the Chief Minister of a troubled 
40 
state." It was exactly during this time that 9 state 
Assemblies including that of Orissa were dissolved by the 
41 Centre. Thus a crippled Acharya Ministry came to an end 
on 30th April 1977. 
40. Mohapatra, J.K. op.cit., p-210. 
41. The Statesman (Calcutta), 1 May 1977 
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CONCLUSION 
Keeping in view the above discussion we may infer 
the following conclusions. 
The hypothesis that core members of the party hardly 
shift their loyalty is found untenable. In 1970 Nandini 
Satpathy, Binayak Acharya and S.S. Mohapatra were the core 
member of one faction called Satpathy faction. But in 1974 
Acharya became the core member of another faction opposing 
his former friend Mrs. Satpathy. Similar is the case of 
Ex-rPSP men S.N. Dwivedi, B.B. Das, N.K. Khuntia who were 
Mrs. Satpathy's strong allies but later on revolted against 
her. Thus personal interests of group leaders are the 
main factors of factionalism. A member whether core or peri-
pheral - would tend to leave the faction the moment he 
realises that the shifting would serve his interest better. 
Another conclusion is that, in the Congress system 
the High Command plays the decisive role. When Satpathy was 
imposed as the Chief Minister, her faction was in minority 
while her detractors were in majority. Again when she was 
sacked in 1976, she enjoyed the support of the overwhelming 
majority in the party. The legislators and party-men had 
to digest the rulings of the High Command, Thus the faction 
which could manage to win the favour of the High Command, 
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was sure of victory irrespective of its support base in the 
rank and file of the party in the state. 
As the factional conflict intensifies, the leaders 
of both factions are inclined to seek support of sister orga-
nisations placed horizontally and power-holders placed ver-
tically above and bellow them. The Satpathy faction mobili-
zed students' and Women's Organisation on its side, while 
the Patnaik-Acharya faction sought and got the support of 
the state unit of the Youth Congress. Similarly, both the 
faction tried desparately to cajole and win over the party 
bosses in New Delhi. 
Fractionalism tends to produce inter-party as well 
as intra-party alliances. Mrs. Satpathy, due to her commu-
nist background sought CPI support in order to counter dissi-
dents. Similarly, dissidents in Orissa, mostly ex-PSP men, 
tried Clandestinely to help J.P's movement to bring an early 
end to Mrs. Satpathy's Ministry. 
Another hypothesis tested was the strong link between 
political elites and the press during factional fight. The 
example of Dharitri - the Oriya daily founded by Mrs. Satpathy 
is a point in the case. 
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CHAPTER - V 
FACTIONALISM DURING JANATA RULE 
The country had experienced thrilling political deve-
lopments following the unscheduled radio broadcast on Janu-
ary 17 1977 by Indira Gandhi announcing the dissolution of 
the Lok Sabha and holding of resh elections to the House in 
March. The emergency rules and press censorship were rela-
xed. The leaders and workers of political parties detained 
during the emergency were released. The Lok Sabha was for-
mally dissolved by the President, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmad on 
January 18, 1977. Hectic political activities started all 
over the country. The four non-congress opposition parties 
Jana Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal, Congress (0) and Socialist 
Party and a few former congress leaders who also suffered 
during emergency because of their support to JP's "total re-
volution" hurriedly came to form a new political organisation 
christened as Janata Party. 
On February 2, 1977 Babu Jagjivan Ram resigned from 
the Congress ; so did H.N. Bahuguna and Mrs. Nandini Satpathy 
former Chief Ministers of U.P. and Orissa respectively and 
R.K. Ganesh, a former Union Minister. They formed a new 
1. The Statesman (Calcutta), 3 February 1977. 
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political outfit labelled as CFD (Congress for Democracy) 
and decided to fight the election in alliance with the 
Janta Party. The CFD headed by Babuji gave a new momentum 
to the anti-congress movement in the country. The elections 
were held from March 16 to 20, 1977 and to the surprise of 
all the Janata Party swept the polls in Northern India 
capturing 271 out of 542 seats in Lok Sabha. The Congress 
which got only 152 seats was practically routed in northern 
India. And to cap it all, Mrs. Gandhi was beaten to dust 
in her Rai Bareilley constituency by the Socialist leader 
Raj Narain. 
Soon after the result were out the Emergency was lift-
ed. So also the Press censorship. The suspended fundamen-
tal rights were restored and the ban order on some social 
and religious organisations was withdrawn. The political 
millieu of the country was, by and large, normalised. Mrs. 
Gandhi tendered her resignation on March 22, 1977 signall-
ing the end of thirty-years old uninterrupted Congress rule 
in independent India. The Janata leader Mr. Morarji Desai, 
was sworn in as the new Prime Minister on March 24, 1977. 
In Orissa also the Janata Party which fought the ele-
ctions in alliance with CFD and the CPI (M) bagged 16 
2. The Hindustan Standard, 23 March 1977. 
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(Janata 16, CFD-1, CPI(M)-l)outof 21 Parliamentary seats. 
The Congress got only four seats and one went to the former 
Maharaja of Kalahandi, P.K. Deo, who contested the election 
as an independent backed by the Congress. The unexpected 
success of the Janata was largely due to the popular image 
of Biju Patnaik among the people. 
The Congress Ministry of Mr. Binayak Acharya was 
dismissed by the Centre along with other congress-ruled 
3 
states on 30 April 1977. Fresh elections to the State 
Assembly were held on June 10, 1977. The Janata Party 
led by Mr. Biju Patnaik swept the polls while the Congress 
was completely routed. It was a virtual white-wsash of the 
Congress. Out of 147 seats in the Assembly, Janata Party 
got 110 seats; Congress 26, CPI and CPI(M) one each and in-
dependents nine. This was unprecendented in Orissa because 
no single party in the state had secured such an overwhel-
ming majority in the past. Cementing on the poll out-come 
Sunit Gosh writes: 
"A radical change in Orissa's political landscape 
was perhaps the most remarkable feature of the poll outcome. 
Other noteworthy features were: first, the emergence for 
the first time of a single political party as a formidable 
3. The Statesman, 1 March 1977. 
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non-congress force through the democratic process; secondly, 
dis-integration of the geo-political barrier between the 
coastal and the hill areas; and thirdly, re-emergence of 
4 
Mr. Biju Patnaik as the undisputed leader of Orissa." 
THE 1977 MID-TERM ELECTION TO ORISSA ASSEMBLY* 
S. 
No. 
Party Sealts 
Contested Won 
Valid vote 
% of seats percentage 
1. Janata Party 147 110 
2. Congress 146 26 
3. CPI 26 1 
4. CPI(M) 4 1 
5. Independents 282 9 
74.83 
17.69 
0.68 
0.68 
6.12 
49,24 
31.01 
3.57 
0.88 
15.30 
TOTAL 604 147 100% 100% 
In the meeting of the JLP, Nilamoni Routray, a trus-
ted man of Biju Patnaik was elected as the leader. He 
formed a 14-member ministry which took the oath of office 
and secrecy on 26th June 1977, 
The Routray Ministry assimied office with a euphoria 
and confident majority in the Assembly. People, for long 
fed up with the mis-rule of Congress and political instabi-
lity took a seigh of relief and poured down their good wishes 
4"^  Gosh, S., Orissa in Turmoil, (Bookland International 
Bhubaneswar, 1979). p-192 
•The CFD had no separate existence following its merger 
the Janata Party. 
The independents included different factions of the Jhar-
khand Party,Utkal Janata,Kalinga Sena etc.The successful 
independents included seven rebels of the Janata Party. 
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and hope for the new Ministry. Politically, Orissa never 
had it so good. 
Ironically, however, the advantage acquired by the 
Janata Ministry appeared to be slipping out of its hand with-
in six month of its inception with a populr feeling that 
the present government was perhaps no different from the 
previous congress regimes. The very first unpleasant deve-
lopment occurred during the ministry making itself in June 
when several Janata MLAs of Ganjam district openly revolted 
against their leader, the CM, demanding a cabinet rank rep-
resentation for their district. It was only as indication 
or prelude to the shape of things hovering in the offing. 
However, the ways of politics are always queer and 
they has always been queerer in case of Orissa. It is rather 
a strange phenomenon that the efforts to topple the Ministry 
was started and sphereheaded by a person who happened to be 
a cabinet Minister in the state. He was none other than 
Mr. Prahalad Mallik, Minister of Agriculture, Irrigation and 
power, who weilds considerable following among the Harijans. 
He started his operation within a few weeks of the formation 
of the Rautray Government. To attract the support of Adivasi 
and Harijans legislators, he formed an organisation styled as 
the Adivasi and Harijan Cultural Association. Its meeting 
was attended by Jagannath Mallick, the Chief whip of the Govt, 
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and many Ministers and legislators of the two communities. 
Mr. Prahallad Mallick, once a trusted Leutenant of 
Mr. Biju Patnaik and Mr. Rautray, actually hoped for the 
post of Chief Minister, which with the intervention of 
Mr. Biju Patnaik was given to Rautray. This is the root 
cause of Prahallad Mallick's alienation and his subsequent 
dissident activities. Being alarmed by the dissention with 
in Party rank, Mr. Biswanath Pandit the Janata Party President 
in the state, sought explanations from Jagannath Mallick for 
his attending the meeting where plot to topple Rautray Govt. 
5 
was allegedly held. On September 5, 1977, at a joint meeting 
of JLP and MPs from the state the matter was discussed in hot 
atmosphere and the Chief Minister was requested to choos his 
own man of confidence as the Chief Whip. However, no action 
was taken against the powerful dissident leader and Minister 
Mr. Prahallad Mallick. 
There existed a sharp division over the issue of 
Mr. Biswanath Pandit's continuing as the President of the 
Orissa Unit. When Union Health Minister Raj Narain and Janata 
leader Laxmikantama visited Orissa in the first half of 1977, 
to reorganise the party, many legislators and party cadres 
strongly protested against Mr. Pandit's continuance as the 
5. Link, September 11, 1977, p.21 
6. Ibid. 
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President. They have reportedly charged him with misconduct 
towards party members and partisan attitude. Pandit belonged 
to the socialist faction of the Janata Party and it was alle-
ged that the socialist and RSS elements in the party were try-
ing to capture the organisation at the cost of BLD faction 
which is popular in the state due to its leader Biju Patnaik. 
Thus the factional fight came to the fore in a meet-
ing 'of Janata Party's state committee, held in September. The 
meeting brought to sharp focus the brewing dissidence inside 
the party making it clear that harmonious relations of its 
constituents was still a far cry. Noisy demonstration demand-
ing reconstituttlon of what was described as the "socialist-
dominated State Committee" by certain youth factions marred 
the proceedings of the meeting. On the other hand Congress(O) 
and the CFD factions of the Janata Party continued to be dis-
contented because the socialist and the Jana Sangh have been 
given undue representation in the Council of Ministry. Many 
of them felt that the JLP leaders were doing partiality while 
nominating members of different committees of the Assembly. 
The dissidents felt sore at the way Rautray reconsti-
tuted the State Housing Board, Khadi and Village Industries 
Board, Social Welfare Board etc. in which only loyalists were 
adjusted. 
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Having dissatisfied with the function of the Routray 
Ministry which, according to dissidents, had utterly failed 
to fulfill its election pledges, near about 56 MLAs in a 
signed note wanted a reshuffle of the Ministry. However, 
it was Biju Patnaik who came to the rescue of the Chief Minis-
7 
ter and was successful rn assuging the feelings of dissidents. 
Another event which gave golden opportunity to dissi-
dents to demand Chief Minister's resignation was his govern-
ment's treatment towards visiting Mrs. Gandhi in the second 
week of January 1978. The State Government treated Mrs. Gandhi 
as a "State Guest". On 9th June violence broke out in Cuttack 
in the meeting of Mrs. Gandhi and several protesting Janata 
volunteers totalling about 36 were injured in a clash with 
the Police. These injured Janata volunteers who were in hos-
pital in Cuttack went on hunger strike protesting against 
police in-action and demanded Mr. Rautray's immediate resig-
Q 
nation. Yuva Janata and some students leader also joined 
them. Prominent dissidents, including A.N. Singh Deo, Bhagabat 
Behera, Jagannath Mallick, Hara Prasad Patra, Haladhar Mishra 
P. Dora, Gadadhar Giri and A.K. Jena, strongly criticised 
9 the Government's action terming it a "mockery of democracy." 
7. Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) 2 Jan. 1978. 
8. Amrit Bazar Patrika (Calcutta) 11 June 1978. 
9. The Hindustan Times, 11 June, 1978. 
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Another irritant in the state unit of the Janata 
party was the presence of the former Chief Minister Mrs, 
Nandini atpathy, the CFD faction leader in the state. Her 
presence inside the party posed a threat to the Chief Minis-
ter Rautray. Hence Rautrary moblized his BLD legislators 
and others against Mrs. Satpathy. 107 Orissa legislators 
in a signed letter to the Party President Chandrasekhar 
demanded action against her for allegedly antiparty activi-
ties. They cited a reported speech of Mrs. Satpathy at 
Dhenkanal, in which she attacked the Janata Government for 
utilising the .police to achieve vindictive ends. She also 
reported to have said that Rautrary Government represents 
the interest of rich and landlords. They demanded her 
removal from the national executive of the party. 
In the mean time factional fight came to an unprece-
dented new height in the centre. Morarji Desai and Charan 
Singh fell out over some important governmental issues. 
This crisis at the Centre set in motion a realignment of forces 
in Orissa. Mrs. Satpathy, a shrewed politician indeed, sud-
dently changed position and took a softer stand against Mr. 
Rautray. The local daily Dharitri connected with her, which 
10. Link, July 9, 1978. 
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was bitterly criticising Routray Ministry upto now, started 
praising Routray while criticising his boss Mr. Biju Patnaik. 
Another newspaper close to the former Chief Minister Dr. 
Harekrishana Mahatab, 'Prajatantra*, also became hostile to 
Biju. Some Janata Ministers also joined them. The aim was 
to prevent Biju's return to State politics which may seal 
their prospect hermetically. 
By November 1978, groupism and infighting in the 
Orissa Janata Party reached a new hight. A three-day meet-
ing of the state unit's executive and legislature party ended 
in chaos. No one bothered to discuss draught, the rise in 
prices, the slow pace of developmental activities or the or-
ganisational affairs of the party. They all engaged in mud-
slinging. Some legislators attacked Ministers, alleging corrupt 
practices including debauchery. The main target of attack 
was Industries and Mining Minister Mr. H.C. Buxipatra and 
Transport Minister Natabar Pradhan. A group of legislators, 
including Ramakrishna Patnaik, and A.N. Singh Deo, who were 
apparently seeking ministerial positions were reportedly fer-
menting resentment and discontent among the legislators and 
stepping up the campaign against the Routray Government. 
In February 1979, dissident activities grew up. Dissi-
dents in Orissa Janata Legislature party launched a signature 
11. Link, July 9, 1978. 
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campaign for Ithe replacement of the Chief Minister. Although 
the number of signatories to the memorandum demanding Rautray's 
removal was kept a closely guarded secret, but the claimed 
figure varied from 25 to 57. The dissidents appeared to be 
confident of getting a majority in the 117-member JLP. Though 
Biju Patnaik, the Janata Supremeo in the State denied this 
but his air-dash on 21 Feb., 1979 to the State capital while 
the Parliament is in session and his hectic talks with the 
senior party leaders created an impression that dissidents 
demand could no longer be ignored. The dissidents aired their 
view that they would be "most happy" if Mr. Patnaik himself 
12 takes the stewardship of the troublesome state. Dissidents 
drew their inspiration from the defeat of Mr. Ram Naresh Yadev, 
the Chief Minister of U.P. and the acceptance of the Party 
High Command of demand in Bihar for the renewal of mandate by 
13 Mr. Karpoori Thakur, However, the crisis blew over and 
the Union Steel Minister again succeeded in what he calls 
"mollifying the ruffled feelings" of his party colleagues. He 
further classified that, "the legislators wanted me to take 
14 
over. But it is out of question." Thus the move by dissi-
dents to topple the Routray Ministry failed as they could not 
gain the support of Biju Patnaik and other Central leaders. 
12. Indian Express (Delhi), 22 Feb. 1979 
13. Ibid. 
14. Ibid. 
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But the brow-beating of the High Command and Biju 
Patnaik had only a temporary effect on the dissident's 
activities in the state. Again in the very next month a 
considerable section of MLAs openly revoluted against Mr. 
Routray and his cbainet colleagues. These legislators calling 
themselves "pro-changers", sent a delegation of seven leaders, 
including Ramakrishna Patnaik, A.N. Singh Deo, Bhagabat Behera, 
Batakrishna Jena, Surendra Nath Pradhan, and others to Delhi 
15 
with a memorandum demanding change in the ladership. They 
met all the central Ministers and other mebers of the Janata 
Parliamentary Board except A.B, Bajpayee and claimed that 
central leaders were receptive and had assured them to suggest 
Nilamani Routray, the Chief Minister to seek vote of confi-
dence after discussing the matter in the coming Parliamentary 
Boards meeting. Thus, dissidents succeeded in raising the 
first round. 
Another tactical victory for dissidents was scored 
when the Party's Central Parliamentary Board took decision 
asking the Chief Minister, Mr. Routray to seek a fresh vote 
of confidence of the JLP. But their hopes were belied because 
their ranks fast depleted as the date for vote, April 19, 
neared. Most of the dissidents began to feel that the threat 
to Routray's leadership is a direct threat to the leadership 
15. Link, March 18, 1979. 
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of Union Steel Minister Biju Patnaik, against whom they 
dared not to oppose. Even among CFD and Socialist factions 
many were not prepared to support pro-changers. 
In the meantime dissident leaders R.K. Patnaik and 
B. Behera sent telegram to Janata High Command requesting 
them not to allow Mr. Biju Patnaik visit Orissa before 
April 20, because he may influence the legislators and horse-
17 trading might result in. But Mr. Biju Patnaik arrived at 
Bhubaneswar on 14th April and a dialogue between two factions 
was started in the presence of Biju Patnaik at his residence. 
Dissident's leader Mr. R.K. Patnaik had a long dialogue with 
the Chief Minister and Biju Patnaik. It is reported that 
Biju Patnaik asked dissidents to forget all differences and 
18 
cooperate with Mr. Routray. However,after these develop-
ments, pro-changers were almost sure of loosing the day on 
April 19. As expected, Routray won the vote of Confidence 
hands down. 
On May 18, the Chief Minister went to Delhi to pursue 
the Janata High Command on the expansion of his cabinet. But 
the High Command, including the Prime Minister Morarji Desai, 
16. Link, April 22, 1979 
17. Patriot, April 15, 1979 
18. Ibid. 
19. Times of India (Delhi), April 21, 1979. 
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turned down all his pleas. 
Routray had maintained the stability of his govern-
ment for 25 months in spite of efforts by some disgrunted 
elements to pull it down. However, following the Janata 
split at the Centre the Chief Minister was in a fix. 
Following the split at the Centre, three distinct 
groups emerged in the State Janata Party - the ministeria-
lists, who were in an overwhelming majority and wanted the 
state party to be converted to Janata(S); the dissidents 
who wanted to remain with the Janata party, and the third 
group of a few individuals who wanted to keep the state 
Janata Party and the JLP independent of both the Janata and 
20 the Janata (S) till the political situation became clear. 
But displaying master-mindedness of a seasoned politician, 
Routray side-tracked all questions about his party's linkage 
with either of the two Janata groups. He declared that the 
Orissa Government was independent of any faction at the Centre 
and that it would maintain equidistance from both. 
But Prahallad Mallick, a cabinet rank minister in 
Rautray Ministry, who started his dissident operation within 
a few weeks of the formation of the Ministry, established 
20. Indian Express, (Delhi), August 6, 1979. 
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contacts with Jagjivan Ram and came to an understanding 
with his one-time rival Nandini Satpathy and the RSS-Jana 
Sangh faction of the Janata Party. He demanded that 
Routray should announce if the Orissa JLP was a part of 
21 Janata or Janats(S). 
Meanwhile, the former Jana Sangh Minister Biswabhusan 
Harichandan also Joined hands with Mr. Mallick. Both 
started criticising the Rautray Ministry, and Biju Patnaik, 
who alongwith eight BIPs from Orissa defected to Janata(S) 
and joined in Charan Singh's cabinet. Both pursuaded Chandra 
Shekhar to issue directives to Routray to convene a meeting 
of the JLP and to decide who was with the Janata and who 
with the Janata(S). The meeti^ ig was fixed on August 18, 
Routray pleaded that the time was too short. But Chandra 
Shekhar had already issued telegrams to all JLP members, 
convening the meeting of the JLP for August 18. Janata 
22 Party Secretary R.K. Hegde was sent as the observer. 
Routray, then advised the Governor to dismiss Mallick 
and Harichandan from the cabinet and they were served with 
notices of dismissal on August 17. On the very day Chandra 
Shekhar dismissed Routray from the primary membership of 
21. Link, August 26, 1979. 
22. Link, August 26, 1979. 
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the Janata Party for 6 years. But the dismissal of Routray 
made no impact. Only P.K. Das, Minister of Health and 
Education, a known dissident, resigned stating that he felt 
ill at ease while working in a defectors' Ministry. But 
Routray continued to enjoy the majority in the JLP and the 
23 
support of Biju Patnaik. 
On August 18, the Routray Government tried to prevent 
the meeting of the JLP. Section 144 was promulgated in the 
Janata Party office and its surroundings and through one of 
his yes-man the Chief Minister got an induction issued by 
the Bhubaneswar Sub-Judge court preventing Hegde to hold 
the meeting of legislators. But the legislators numbering 
about 30 met at Biswabhusan Harichandan's residence and elec-
ted Prahallad Mallick unanimously as the President of the 
Janata Legislature Party owing alligiance to Chandra Shekhar 
faction. All dissidents, including State Janata Party Presi-
dent Biswanath Pandit, A.N. Singh Deo, Nandini Satpathy, 
R.K. Patnaik etc. joined in the new JLP which became the 
24 
main opposition party in the Assembly. 
Soon after the formal split of the Orissa Janata Party, 
Biju Patnaik came down to Bhubaneswar and got himself elected 
As the President of the Orissa Janata Party (Neutral). Biju, 
23. Patnaik, B.K.: The Politics of Floor-crossing in Orissa 
(Santosh Publications, Cuttack,1985), p-162. 
24. Link, November 11, 1979. 
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to whom the Chief Minister had surrendered lock, stock and 
barrel, wished to fill the posts of outgone Ministers with 
his own loyal followers. But other aspirants would not 
agree to this. They demanded expansion of the Cabinet to 
25 
accommodate them also. 
Biju and Routray were in a fix. They were afraid 
that if the vacancies were filled up with their royal men 
before or during the ensuing short session of the Legisla-
tive Assembly, other aspirants might defect and swell the 
ranks of truncated Janata Party. Thus, the Chief Minister 
announced to expand his Ministry after the short Assembly 
session which commenced on 12 September 1979. On 24 Oct. 
1979,15 new Ministers were taken in a massive expansion of 
26 
Routray Ministry. However, the expansion of the Ministry 
created more problems than it solved. Resentment in the 
Party cadre against Routray ran high on the inclusion in 
the cabinet of Brundaban Naik and Jagannath Mallick. 
Nayak, hitherto the leader of the opposition, defec-
ted from Congress (I) and Joined Lok Dal only to become a 
cabinet Minister. Insiders felt that Nayak was admitted 
to the Party with the hope that it would help in the party's 
prospect in Ganjam district where Nayak has a great deal of 
influence. 
25. Link, November 11, 1979. 
26. Times of India (Delhi) 25 October 1979. 
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Likewise MLAs and party-men are sore over inclusion 
of Jagannath Mallick, who had to relinquish the post of 
Chief Whip in 1977 when he worked hand in glove with Praha-
llad Mallick under the cover of Adivasi and Harijan cultural 
society to over-throw the nascent Routray Government and to 
form a cabinet to be headed by Prahallad Mallick, a Harijan 
In addition to all these factors, the refusal of the two 
members, Govinda Seth and Surendra Sahu, to take oath as 
Minister of State has brought the discontentment to the sur-
facO'To add fuel to the fire, CM. Mishra, Deputy Chairman 
of the State Planning Board, also an aspirant for a berth 
28 in the cabinet, tendered his resignation after the expansion. 
To satisfy the disgruntled, Routray was trying hard 
to rehabilitate them in some official positions. Uday 
Narayan Singh Deo, also cabinet aspirant, has been appoint-
ed the Government Chief Whip, following his predecessor 
V.P. Agarwal joining the Cabinet as the Minister of Transport 
and Turism. Since three out of the four newly admitted cabinet 
Ministers and three out of nine State Ministers were taken 
from Cuttack district a large scale resentment has appeared 
among legislators and party-men belonging to other districts. 
27. Link, November 11, 1979. 
28. Ibid. 
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1980 GENERAL ELECTION 
The Janata experiment had its natural death culmina-
ting in the Congress came-back in January 1980. The failure 
of the Janata Party associates to shed their differences 
and mend fences in the interest of stability led to the dis-
solution of Lok Sabha and fresh election was held in January 
1980. The split in the Janata Party and the political oppor-
tunism of its leadership kept them away from voters' prefere-
nce. The result of the 1980 mid-term General Election was 
not surprising. Congress(I) remped a 333 seats out of 470 
places in which it fielded its candidates. Mrs. Gandhi formed 
the Government. 
Mrs. Gandhi could not forget the Janata assault on 
Congress ruled states in 1977 in dissolving the State legis-
latures where the Janata Party was overwhelmingly elected. 
She followed the suit. The Central Government ordered the 
dissolution of 9 Assemblies and the Presidents Rule was 
clamped upon these states. Orissa was one among those States. 
Thus the Orissa Legislative Assembly was dissolved on 17th 
February 1980 and the Presidents Rule was imposed for sixth 
29 time since independence. With this Routray's ministry fell 
29. Orissa Legislative Assembly in Historical Perspective 
(1973-82) published by Secretariate, OLA, Bhubaneswar. 
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after ruling the State for two years and eight months. 
Fresh elections to Orissa Assembly was held on 31st May 
1980 in which Lok Dal was virtually routed and Congress(I) 
30 
was record"118 seats in the Assembly. 
30. Mishra S.N., Party Politics and Electoral Choice in 
an Indian State. 
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CHAPTER - VI 
RETURN TO CONGRESS SYSTEM 
THE ERA OF J.B. PATNAIK 
The object of this Chapter is to analyse factional-
ism during J.B. Patnaik's first Ministry. Although the 
problem had not been so acute as was the case during the 
previous ministries. However, factional fights during this 
period reveal some unique features which were not observed 
previously 
Average life of a ministry prior to Patnaik's arrival 
was two years and ten months; none of his predecessors could 
complete a full term in the Office in spite of all their 
eminence and unquestionable leadership qualitiies. But 
J.B. Patnaik created a record in completing a full term as 
the CM in Orissa. He towered all his predecessors in deftly 
handling dissidents. The present chapter covers the poli-
tical developments from 1980 to 1985 and in the light of 
findings test the hypotheses. 
After the great debacle in 1977 the congress party in 
the state stood a house divided- Congressmen have engaged 
themselves in mud-sliging. Aftermath of the poll debacle 
some Congressmen became very active in trying to oust Acharya 
Some of the followers of J.B. Patnaik, including some youth 
factions, tried hard for Patnaik to take over. At the same 
time after his defeat from Balasore, the former M.P., S.S. 
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Mohapatra seemed to be aspirant for the P.C.C. President-
ship. Meanwhile the then PCC President Chintamani Jena 
submitted his resignation and was adviced by D.K. Barooah 
to coninue till the organisational election scheduled to 
1 
be held in September. 
This was the state of affairs of the Congress when 
another blow in the form of historic 1978 vertical split 
struck it down to dust. Better known popular leaders like 
the CM, Binayak Acharya, Banka Behari Das, Jagannath Patnaik, 
Trilochan Kanungo, Chintamony Panigrahi, etc. continued in 
the Congress(R), while the emergency men like Janki Ballav 
Patnaik, former Union Minister of state for Defence; K.C. 
Lenka, a former Minister and General Secretary of the PCC, 
Bipin-Das, and M.P. Ram Chandra Rath etc. joined the Cong-
ress(I). Most of the 26th Congress legislators in the 
Assembly joined Congress (R). Janaki Ballav Patnaik was 
elected as the President of PCC(I). Thus the Congress(I) 
was reduced to an insignificant minority in Orissa during 
Janata Rule. 
ASCENDANCY OF J.B. PATNAIK 
The ascendancy of Mr. J.B. Patnaik (better known as 
1. Link, 10 April, 1977. p-14. 
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Patnaik the younger) in the politics of Orissa opened up 
a new chapter in the state. He had by now associated his 
name to the entire era - the era of J.B. A brief account 
of his Political life is necessary to understand his poli-
tical style. 
That man's appearance is often deceptive holds true 
to J.B. Patnaik. No wonder the first impression varies 
from man to man. If some consider him too easily manageable 
and harmless, other feel that he is cold and aloof by tem-
perament, while still others consider him high and mighty. 
Little wonder he is an enigma to many. That's why his 
stewardship of the Congress(I) in the state on the eve of 
election to seventh Lok Sabha was suspect even to seasoned 
journalists and observers who did not mince words to point 
him as light weight in comparison to Patnaik the ielder 
(Biju Patnaik) Rabi Roy and other stalwarts of Janata Party 
and Lok Dal. But the results of the 1980 Lok Sabha elections 
proved the doubting Thomases to be absolutely wrong. 
His rise in the politics is neither flashy nor mete-
oric. That is why few took note of the strides he was as 
tutely taking all these years to brust forth on the State's 
political scene. After completing his M.A. in Political 
Science from B.H.U. in 1949 he joined the then Chief Minister 
Dr. Mahtab's English daily the Eastern Times as sub-editor 
* 
In 1950 he become the president of Orissa Youth Congress. 
Ill 
Split of 1969 gave him the much needed scope to contact with 
the Congress Party headed by Mrs. Gandhi. He was elected 
to Lok Sabha in 1971 from Cuttack. In the p(oll-fray, he 
had to contend with the challange of late Biren Mitra - the 
redoubtable 'Dada' of Cuttack and an Ex^-C.M. But J.B. 
Patnaik humbled Mr. Mitra by a comfortable margin. 
After a short spell as M.P., he was inducted into the 
central cabinet as the deputy Minister of Defence under 
Jagjivan Ram. This gave him chance to come closer to Mrs. 
Gandhi, Sanjay Gandhi and other top notchers of the Congress 
Party. 
With the Emergency, Sanjay Gandhi emerged on the 
scene as an all dominating figure. Patnaik organised his 
hurricane tour of Orrissa. The compliments he paid to 
Mr. Gandhi in the Cuttack Public meeting earned him the 
sobrequet of "Chamcha". But he was unperturbed. He sided 
with Sanjay to the hilt in his rub with the then Orissa 
Chief Minister, Mrs.Nandini Satpathy. Shortly afterwards 
the all-powerful Nandini had to eat humble pie. She was 
ignonimously eased out of the Orissa "gaddi", and Sri 
Binayak Acharya was installed in her place. This episode 
revealed the power Mr. Patnaik weilded at the Centre. 
The momentous year of 1977 saw the rout Mrs. Indira 
Gandhi and her powerful Congress Party. J.B. Patnaik lost 
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Parliamentary seat. Revealations by various enquiry commi-
ssions unnerved many a congress stalwart. When his well-
wishers urged Mr. Patnaik to reconsider his stand, his reply 
was that it was a temporary aberration in India's body 
politic. :Wait and see, she will be back in power soon", 
2 
quipped Mr. Patnaik. Many scoffed at his readings. Bereft 
of friends, the plunged head-long into the task of re-orga-
nising the party. Thus, the base assiduously built up during 
the two and half years of the Janata Rule paid Congress(I) 
rich dividends in Lok Sabha polls of 1980. 
The credit of thion^ jing victory of the Cognress(I) 
in Orissa goes to a great extent to Sri J.B. Patnaik. He 
utilized Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Charisma to the hilt to build 
up a well-greased party machine, that out-witted those of 
Sri Biju Patnaik's Lok Dal. Mr. J.B. Patnaik is neither 
a demagogue nor a rabble-rouser. He is cool and calculating 
in thought and action. And once a decision is arrived at 
he pursues the same tenatiously, irrespective of the hurd-
les is the way. 
THE GENERAL ELECTION OF t980 AND FACTIONALISM 
With 13 million voters Orissa went to polls on Janu-
ary 3, 1980 to elect 21 members to the Seventh Lok Sabha. 
2. Organiser, 23 March 1980. 
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But factionalism within the Congress (I) Party came to sur-
face with the nomination of Chintamoni Jena to contest from 
Balasore constituency. Shyam Sunder Mohapatra, who repre-
sented the constitutency earlier, was ignored because, it 
was alleged, J.B. Patnaik, the President of P.C.C.(I) and 
3 Mohapatra's archrival, stood in his way. In fact Patnaik 
who was also in the charge of -ielectioneering in Orissa could 
successfully eliminate not only Mohapatra but his entire 
group of followers by not giving them on opportunity to con-
4 
test in the elections. Mohapatra was close to Indira Gandhi 
and had stood by her during her worst days. But he failed 
to get Lok Sabha ticket as Sanjay Gandhi reportedly opposed 
his candidature under the influence of J.B. Patnaik. 
Thus, Congress(I) on the eve of 1980 General Election 
was a house divided into two factions. The majority or 
dominant faction led by J.B. Patnaik the P.C.C.(I) Chief 
and the minority faction led be S.S. Mohapatra. 
The result of the mid-term poll was not surprising 
Congress(I) won the election with flying colours. In Orissa 
it was a near white-wash-Congress(I) captured all but one 
3. Padhi, K.S. Midterm Lok Sabha Elections in Orissa -
An analysis in Indian Journal of Political Science, 
December 1980 vol.41(4) P-781-801. 
4. Link - 24 August 1980. P-17 
im 
seat. It secured 20 seats whereas the ruling Lok Dal 
or Janata(S) could capture only one seat. Rest of the 
parties drew blank. With the landslide victory of Congress(I) 
J.B. Patnaik's stature in the eye of congress(I) High 
Command shot up. He was amply rewarded with a berth in 
the Central Cabinet his portfolio being Tourism and Civil 
Aviation. He became very close confident of Sanjay Gandhi 
and Indira Gandhi after the election. 
On 17th Feb. 1980 Mrs. Gandh's Government following 
the precedent established by Janata regime dissolved those 
state Assembly where Janata Dal was in majority. Thus, on 
5 
17.2.1980 President's Rule was promulated on Orissa and 
Nilamani Routray's. Ministry fell. Fresh election to 
Orissa Assembly were held on 31 May 1980. The Congress(I) 
under the stewardship of J.B. Patnaik the then Union Cabinet 
Minister swept the polls while Janata(S) was completely 
routed. Congress(I) by capturing 118 out of 147 seats 
created history. Janata(S) of Biju Patnaik fared unexpectedly 
poor and could only capture 13 seats. In 1977, Biju Patnaik 
was a Union Cabinet Minister in Janata Government 
and was appointed Incharge of electioneering 
in 1980. The Patnaik Vrs. Patnaik game this time 
5. Misra S.N. tParty politics and Electoral Choice in an 
Indian State 1989, p-364. 
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benefited the younger Patnaik. Other political parties 
who could manage to enter the Assembly were Janata (Chandra-
sekhar) 3, CPI 4, Congress(R) 2 and independents 7. 
The biggest electoral victory in Orissa since 
independence which went to the ciredit of Cognress(I) was 
mainly attributed to the negative impact of Janata rule. 
The congress (I) not only created record in capturing 118 
seats but it created yet another record when it clearly 
swept polls in Sundergarh, Sambalpur, Bolangir, Phulbani, 
Kalahandi and Koraput districts. The opposition failed 
7 
even to win a single seat in these "Garjat" districts. 
1980 MID-TERM ELECTION TO O.L.A. 
SEATS 
^^^^y Contested 
1. Congress(I) 
2. Congress(V) 
3. B.J.P. 
4. Janata(S)/L.D. 
5. Janata(Raj 
Narain) 
6. Janata 
(Chandrasekher) 
7. C.P.I. 
8. C.P.I.(M) 
147 
97 
29 
111 
2 
29 
27 
14 
Won 
118 
2 
-
13 
-
3 
4 
— 
%sige of 
votes 
47.93 
7.07 
1.42 
19.56 
0.05 
4.01 
4.78 
2.20 
foSLge of 
seats 
80.27 
1.36 
-
8.84 
-
2.04 
2.72 
Qontd. 
Deposit 
Loss 
-
74 
26 
39 
2 
14 
11 
7 
6. Misra S.N. Op.cit. p 128-129. 
7. The Hindu (Mad). 8th June 1980. 
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9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
Jharkhand 
All India 
(Jharkhan) 
sue I 
Forward Block 
Independents 
TOTAL 
19 
7 
8 
5 
141 
736 
-
-
-
-
7 
147 
0.56 
0.05 
0.57 
0.10 
11.88 
100 
4.77 
18 
2 
7 
5 
111 
100 416 
Source: Election Office Record. 
After the election, the Con,gress High Conunand deci-
ded to send the lone member of Orissa in the Union Cabinet 
Mr. J.B. Patnaik to lead the Orissa Ministry. On June 6, 
Mr. Patnaik was unanimously elected as the leader of the 
Congress (I) Legislature party. 
On 9 June, a 19 member Congress(I) Ministry with 
J.B. Patnaik as its head was sworn in. It marked the end 
of 113 days President's rule in Orissa. Thus, Patnaik 
headed 18th Ministry of the State and was the 14th Chief 
Minister of the state since Orissa came into being. The 
three tier ministry was as follows: 
10. Hindustan Times (Delhi) 10 June 1980, 
11. Misra, S.N. Op.cit - p 265. 
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S. Ministers of 
No. Cabinet Rank 
Minister of 
States 
Deputy 
Minister 
1. Mr.Gangadhar MohapatraJL. Har ihar Karan l.Mrs.S.Hembram 
2. Raghunath Patanaik 
3. K.C. Lenka 
4. Ram Chandra Ulaka. 
5. Upendra Dixit 
6. Dayanidhi Naik 
7. Basudev Mohapatra. 
2. Niranjan Patnaik. 
3. B.K. Biswal 
4. H. Khan 
5. J.K. Patnaik 
6. Bhajaman Behera 
7. K.C. Patnaik 
8. K.C. Patel 
9. Kunaria Majhi 
10. L.M. Gandhi 
Ministry making apart, the ugly and sub-merged head 
of factionalism had come to surface just after the elec-
tions were announced. Party tickets were distributed at 
the instances of Mr. J.B. Patnaik. He assidusouly elmina-
ted all supporters of Mohapatra faction, In the name of 
High Command. About 50 rebel Congress candidates were in 
the electoral fray in Orissa to the embarrassment of party 
leadership. The revolt against this authoritarian behaviour 
of party leadership was more pronounced in Ganjam and 
Bolengir districts. The Congress(I) Chairman of Bolargir 
Municipality, Mr. Parsuram Hota and DCC(I) General Secretary. 
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N.P. Joshi were among the rebels, contested as indepen-
12 dents against the Official Congress(I) nominees. On 
11 May, 1980 Orissa P.C.C.(I) President J.B. Patnaik, 
taking serious note to this development, expelled 49 
party-men who contested election as independents after 
they were denied party tickets. Included among those ex-
pelled were leaders like S.N. Patnaik, a former Minister 
P.C. Gherei, a loriner General Secretary of P.C.C. (un-
divided Congress), Mrs. Sarendri Nayak and Batakrushna 
13 Panda of Rourkela. 
In new Delhi, the leader of anti J.B. Patnaik 
faction, Mr. S.S. Mohapatra was eager for his political 
rehabitation. Known as an efficient manipulator, Mohapatra 
could manage to win the confidence of Sanjay Gandhi in 
his last days. Taking advantage of Patnaik's absence 
from Delhi, he succeeded in carving out a place in thehieart 
of Mrs. Gandhi also. Thereupon, he got himself nominated 
as General Secretary of AICC(I) along with Sanjay Gandhi. 
These development gave aniiopression in the minds of Cong-
ressmen in the state that Patnaik and Rath had lost their 
grounds at the centre. In addition to this Mohapatra's 
12. Times of India (Delhi) 7 May 1980 
13. Amrit Bajaj- Patnaik (Cal) 12 May, 1980. 
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nomination to Rajya Sabha came as a blow for Patnaik and 
his supporters. In spite of all these development, 
Patnaik's men were hopeful that their leader would be 
able to withstand all the challenges with the blessing 
of Sanjay Gandhi. But the sudden demise of Sanjay Gandhi 
14 in the plane-crash dashed all their hopes. 
Never before any political party come to power in 
Orissa with such a massive majority in the state Asembly 
as the Congress(I) did; and never before a chief Minister 
had face so much hostility from his own party members 
with-in a few month of his installation as J.B. Patnaik 
was facing. An overwhelming majority in the state lagis-
lature has always been a source of worry for the party 
leader. In the case of Patnaik it had not been different. 
As Mishra puts it: 
The misfortune of massive majority was gradually 
felt by the Congress leadership. Only twenty odd members 
finding berth in the council of Ministers it was difficult 
task to please and solicit cooperation from nearly 100 
members.15 
Ministry - making was not a very difficult task for 
Patnaik as for other state Chief ministers because of Patnaik's 
14. Link, 24 Aug., 1980. 
15. Misra S.N. Op.cit. p.131-132. 
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proximity to Indira Gaadhi. Persons were rejected or 
selected under the name of Congress High Command. Although 
Patnaik was rewarded with the Chief Ministership by the 
Party High Command, but in the process he made quite a few 
enemies in his own party such as K,C. Lenka, a member of 
his own cabinet in charge of Revenue portfolio. Equally 
ambitious for the Chief Minister "^s post were S.S. Mohapatra, 
M.P., B.M. Mohanty Union Deputy Minister of Civil Supply 
and Laxman Mallick a very shrwed scheduled caste M.P. of 
Orissa. 
Mr. Lenka, a non-descript politician only a few years 
ago, came closer to power centre in the State when he was 
included in the cabinet of Nandini Satpathy. A trade Union 
leader from Chaudwar constituency in Cuttack district, he 
made his fortune when he was a Minister. It is alleged 
that he acquired huge property, a number of petrol pumps 
and a cinema house in Cuttack. Lenka, known as a good or-
ginser worked hard with Patnaik to galvanise the Congress(I) 
party in the state after the 1978 split. He was also close 
to the High Command. None would have bothered if Mr. Lenka 
had been satisfied with his piles. But problem arose as 
he sought to project himself as a rival of Patnaik in power 
16. Organiser: 32 (46) 5 April, 1981. p-1-2. 
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game. The result, at the time of election, was that there 
was no love lost between Patnaik and Lenka. During elec-
tion to the Assembly, Patnaik's camp allegedly did its 
best to sabotage the election of Lenka from Chaudwar cons-
titency. But Lenka came through and openly challenged the 
claim of Patnaik to the legislature party's leadership. 
Later he tactically lay low but never gave up his ambition 
for occupying highest office of the state. But it could 
have sounded better had Patnaik contested in the June poll 
instead of being imposed from the Centre. This could 
have taken teeth out of his political opponent Lenka. 
The second major rival of Patnaik was Shyam Sunder 
Mohapatra. A shrewd politican indeed, he was practically 
in oblivion so long as Mrs. Satpathy was in power. Later, 
all his effort to come closer to the high command were 
frustrated by J.B. Patnaik. He was so effectively bottled 
up by Patnaik that he was even denied a ticket to contest 
the last parliamentary election from his own district 
Balasore. But he did not lose heart. With great tenacity 
he cultivated R.K. Dhawan, Principal private secretary to 
Prime Minister and eventually succeeded in coming closer 
to Sanjay Gandhi and the Prime Minister. Shortly after 
Mr. Patnaik left for the State to take over the administra-
tion, Mohapatra entered Congress(I) headquarter as a General 
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Secretary of AICC(I) and within a few days became a member 
of Rajya Sabha from Orissa Assembly making others envious 
17 
of his growing political stature in so short a time. 
The third potential contender was B.M. Mohanty, a 
former Minister in Nandini Satpathy's cabinet and the speaker 
of the Assembly. A quiet operator, Mohanty knows how to 
keep the cards close to the chest. Though less biimptious 
than two others, he is no less ambitious about the high 
office of the State's Chief Minister. 
Worries of J.B. Patnaik deepened after his protege 
Ram Chandra Rath fell out with him. This All India Youth 
Congress(I) President thought that Mrs. Gandhi had done 
injustice to him by not offering him a cabinet post. 
Mrs. Gandhi rewarded this close confidant of her late 
younger son with a berth in her Ministry. He was appoin-
ted as Minister of State for fertilizer and Chemicals. He 
was also labouring under impression that Patnaik - his 
mentor - had not done what he should have to promote his 
inerest. The relation between the 1wo had further stained 
after the death of, in suspicious circumstances, a girl 
in Delhi, Source close to Rath circulated a canard among 
Orissa M.P's and MLAs about the Chief Minister's involve-
ment in the sordid affairs. 
17. Ibid. 
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FACTIONALISM DEEPENEDt 
Factional fight in the state intensified in May 
1981 on the eve of by-election for the Cuttack Parliamen-
tary seat which was lying vacant following the resignation 
of J.B. Patnaik. While Chief Minister and P.C.C. Chief 
Chintamoni Jena and their followers wanted to put Mrs. 
Jayanti Patnaik, the Chief Minister's wife as a candidate, 
the opposite faction in the party led by S.S. Mohapatra, 
18 the AICC(I) General Secretary tried hard for Mr. A.P.Ray. 
In this round Chief Minister's faction won as the case of 
Mr. Roy was very weak as compared to Mrs. Patnaik. Another 
reason was Patnaik's closeness to Rajiv and Mrs. Gandhi 
and other top brass of Congress High Command. In the elec-
tion Mrs Patnaik won with flying colours, inspite of the 
sabotage efforts by the rival faction. The allegation that 
anti-patnaik faction worked for opposition was butressed 
by the fact that very large number of votes were polled 
by the opposition nominee in Chawduar Assembly segment, 
the constitutency of dissident Minister Lenka, However, 
despite alleged sabotage by the dissident the victory of 
18. Patriot, 4 May, 1981. 
124 
Mrs. Patnaik raised the stock of J.B. Patnaik both in state 
19 
and in New Delhi. 
Soon after the election, the CM. J.B. Patnaik, 
apparently after obtaining green-signal from the High Command 
eased out the senior most minister in his cabinet, K.C. Lenka 
20 
who held the portfolio of revenue and excise. Thus, Patnaik 
got rid of his most formidable rival. But the sacking of 
Lenka facilitated him (Mr. Lenka) to come openly against 
the former which he oculd not do otherwise. As a result 
factionalism was gradually taking a new dimension towards 
the second half of the 1981. 
After his sacking in July Lenka camped in Delhi 
to explain his grivancies to party High Coammand. He placed 
before Rajiv Gandhi and other leaders several photostat 
copies in support of his allegations. At the same time 
some MLA's and several Youth Congress functionaries presen-
ted memorandum to the Prime Minister on 22 July 1980 citing 
instances of omission and commission by the Patnaik 
Ministry. One of the major allegation was that he had built 
up a coterie of people related to him and a powerful con-
21 tractor's lobby is influencing the government's decisions. 
19. Indian Express (Delhi) 19 June, 1981. 
20.. Times of India (Delhi) 20, July 1981. 
21. The Hindu (Mad) 23 July, 1981. 
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other allegations against Patnaik was that his style 
of functioning had alienated him from the bulk of partymen; 
that he was corrupt and had shown favouratism by appointing 
five Patnaiks as Ministers in the 18-member Ministry. They 
also pointed out that the CM bore a grudge against Lenka 
because he had opposed writing off arrears of Rs.3.5 crores 
from mining lessies. Lenka had also opposed writing off 
Rs. 1.5 crore arrears of electricity charges due from an 
industrialist. It was also alleged that the Chief Minister 
had done nothing towards implementing Prime Minister's 
22 20 point programme in the state. 
However, the Chief Minister's faction strongly denied 
these charges and the Finance Minister R.N. Patnaik came 
to Delhi with some other MLA's to counter the acitivities 
launched there by dessident leader, Lenka. In a press con-
ference in New Delhi, the Finance Minister categorically 
denied the charges levelled against Patnaik, and announced 
that the government would agree to an enquiry by the Centre 
23 into these charges. At the same time, the Chief Minister, 
also refuted these charges and declared in a press confe-
rence that there were "no dessident" and "there is cent 
22. Hindustan Times (Delhi), 19 July 1981. 
23. Statesman (Delhi), 23 July 1981. 
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percent support for me in the legislature party." Ques-
tioned of ttiat cent perceat included, Lenka, Patnaik asked, 
24 
"Has Mr. Lenka demanded a change in the leadership openly?" 
But the move of dissidents got a set back as the 
Prime Minister did not respond warmly to the destahilisation 
move led by Lenka. A handful of Lenka's supporters expected 
that a number of neutral Cognress(I) MAL's would join them 
after their leader's return from New Delhi. But they were 
dissappointed since Lenka was allowed to see Mrs Gandhi 
only after a week-long wait. And that too ended with a 
very dissappoinitng note. 
After a lull, the dissident activities grew again 
in the wake of Pirme Minister's visit to Bhubaneswar in 
September 4. The one-day visit of Mrs. Gandhi was for making 
26 
an assessment of the performance of the Patnaik Ministery. 
But t h e d i s s i d e n t s who were very a c t i v e dur ing her visit,became 
demoralisedr^^iien Mrs.Gandhi warned them not t o go p r e s s about 
their allegation agaisnt the Ministry. On the other hand, 
27 
she appreciated the performance of Patnaik Ministery. 
24. The Hindu (Mad) 24 July 1981 
25. Patriot, 26 July, 1981, 
26. Patriot, 10 October 1981. 
27. Patriot, 10 October 1981. 
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Soon after her departure there was a closed door 
meeting of some dissidents and a former Chief Minister. 
Ram Chandra Rath, M.P. and a known Parnaik detractor, con-
vened a get together of legislators at Bhubaneswar circuit 
House which was attended by about 40 legislators, including 
the Minister of State for community Development and 
Panchayat Raj, K.C, Patnaik and deputy speaker Himansusekhar 
Padhi.^^ 
Factionalism became sharper in 1982. The dissident 
went on the offensive at the January 12 meeting of the 
state party executive held at Bhubaneswar. This an indi-
cation of growing infighting. This was the first time in 
the one-and-a-half year tenure of his ministry that the 
dissidents were so outspoken in the presence of the Chief 
Minister, J.B. Patnaik. At the PCC(I) meeting all had kept 
mum. Not that his opponents made any revelation about 
Mr. Patnaik and his men. It was the same old wine in 
new bottle. The principal allegation was that Mr Patnaik 
is acting on the councel of a "ruling clique" consisting 
of five persons. They were: Mr. Basanta Biswal, a minis-
ter of state for works, housing, mining and geology whose 
intimacy with Patnaik dates back to boyhood days; Mrs. 
Jayanti Patnaik, M.P. and the wife of the Chief Minister, 
28. Ibid. 
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Dr. H.K. Mahtab, the Veteran politician and an Ex. Chief 
Minister Mr. Niranjan Patnaik, Minister of state for irri-
gation and power who is elder brother of Chief Minister's 
son-in-law; and M.I.M. Patnaik an executive engineer under 
whome Biswal served as a contractor before his initiation 
29 to politics by J.B. Patnaik in 1978. 
Appearance of this "ruling clicque" lent credence 
to the view that under the Patnaik government the contrac-
tors and mine-owners had come to the fore.. Together, in-
deed, these persons hold charge of most of the departments 
by which contracts are given. Allegation surfaced regard-
30 ing favourtism and kickbacks. It is not dissidents alone 
who alleged that the cabinet was not functioning like a 
•team* because of special power enjoy by Mr. Biswal; even 
the Finance Minister Mr. Raghunath Patnaik complained 
personally to the Chief Minister about Biswal's habit of 
interfering in the affairs of other departments. He also 
referred to several instances of alleged diversion of funds, 
including those meant for building houses for tribals 
which were said to have been used for constructing a market 
31 
complex in Cuttack. 
29. Indian Express 22 Jan., 1982. 
30. Ibid. 
31. Indian Express (Delhi) 20 May, 1982. 
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Another allegation against Mr. Patnaik was that 
he is not loyal to the Prime Minister. Some of the examples 
they cited were the Government's covert and overt support 
to the RSS State convention held in December^the total 
neglect of 20 Point Programme. 
In September 1981, another chance had come up to 
prove Mr. Patnaiks disloyality. At that time the state 
unit of the Friends of Soviet Union was being formed and 
the dissidents had taken the initative to capture the Unit. 
The dissidents hurriedly joined in intending to find a new 
channel to Mrs. Gandhi and to prove before her that she 
could not rely upon Mr. Patnaik any longer. Perhaps the 
subject was sensitive and the Chief Minister afterwards 
went to Delhi and with the consultation with the central 
FSU leaders turned the tables by getting a new committee 
formed. 
Corruption was the favourite weapon of the dissi-
dents to strike at Patnaik Ministry. But corruption was 
also a question agitating the vocal public in the state. 
It may not be too far fetched to see a relation between 
the growing public disappointment and the emboldening of 
the dissidents. Another factor that encouraged the dissi-
31. Indian Express (Delhi) 20 May, 1982, 
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dents to demand a rightful place in the party and the govern-
ment was believed to be the possibility of the opposition 
unity. 
By November 1982, dissident activity grew to such 
an extent that the Congress High Command had to take a serious 
note. J.B. Patnaik succeeded in convincing the High Command 
of the ulterior motives of the dissidents. Thus, on 5 
November three dissident leaders in the Orissa Assembly -
Sheikh Matlub Ali, Mr. Bipin Das and K.C. Lenka were served 
show-cause notice by the High Command. They had been asked 
to explain within 10 days time. Talking to newsman in 
Delhi AICC(I) general secretary G.K. Moopanar, M.P., said 
33 that "indicipline can not be tolerated at any cost." This 
was followed by the sacking of Mr. Bipin Das as the party 
Chief Whip and Mr. Ali as the Secretary of the legislature 
party. 
In disregarding the threat of disciplinary action 
against them the dissidents reiterated their determination 
to prevent "sabotage" of the 20 - point programme by the 
state government. The dissidents drew solace from the 
support of Mr. Patnaik's friend-turn - foe Ram Chandra Rath, 
the Union Minister of state for Fertilizer and chemicals, 
32. Indian Express (Delhi) 22 Jan. 1981. 
33. National Herald, 5 November, 1982. 
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who had been touring the state and stressing the need, in 
public meetings, of speedly implementation of Prime 
Minister's 20-Point Programme. Another source of inspira-
tion was former AlCC (I) General Secretary S.S. Mohapatra. 
Although Mohapatra, after getting instructions from the 
Prime Minister remained aloof from compaign against the 
Chief Minister, but he had not prevented his followers to 
dissociate from anti-patnaik activities. 
VIOLENT TURN 
The differences between the loyalists and the dissi-
dents, which were so far confined to memoranda to the centre, 
or platform speeches decended to street fighting and physical 
assults. On that day a meeting was arranged at the circuit 
House of Bhadrak where Mr. Ram Chandra Rath was to address 
the Party's workers. It was organised by dissident leader, 
Arjun Sethi, M.P. from Bhadrak, and Netrananda Mallick, MLA 
from Chandbali. Some of the Chief Minister's men shouting 
anti-Rath slogans attacked Rath's motorcade and four of his 
34 followers were injured in the incidents. The public 
meeting which followed the incident, passed off peacefully. 
Several dissident leaders, including K.C. Patnaik, the 
second minister to be axed off by the Chief Minister after 
34. Hindustan Times 9 December, 1982. 
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Lenka, severely criticised the failured of Patnaik Ministry, 
About 20 dissident MLA's wrote a letter to the 
Prime Minister expressing their concern over the brutal 
assult on one of their collegues (Mr. N. Mallick) and four 
other party workers. They pointed out that under the admi-
nisteration of Patnaik, their personal security was at 
35 
stake. However, the Chief Minister Mr. J.B. Patnaik 
refuted dissidents I charge that he had any hand in the Dec. 
8, incident. 
In the following month, Orissa Congress(I) was 
rattled by Poll reverses in Andhra and Karnataka. Andra 
Pradesh, the neighbouring state of Orissa in the south 
contains a considerable Oriyas in its border constituen-
cies in which Congress(I) politicians from Orissa had gone 
for compaigning. After the results both factions started 
blaiming each other for the reverses. Ministerialists 
attributed the rout of the party on the dissident activity 
in Andhra,giving a warning to the central leadership not 
to be indulgent to the dissidents in Orissa. On the other 
hand dissidents emphasised that the verdict was not against 
Mrs. Gandhi but due to the misrule of men-in-power inthose 
35. Hindustan Times, 11 December 1982. 
36. Patriot, 11 December, 1982. 
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states. In fact, the observation implied that Mrs. Gandhi 
should keep a close watch on the functioning and performance 
of the state cabinet. 
Thus the Congress(I)'s rout in the states election 
in 1983 coupled with the merger of main opposition parties 
in Orissa, sharpened the factional fight in the State. The 
dissident leaders gave ultimatiom to the party High Command 
giving them January 26 as the deadline for a change in 
leadership. This ultimatum was served to the High Command 
because the dissidents were reportedly given to understand 
that their grivances would be looked into after the elec-
tion to three states were over. 
In the mean time dissidents, having realised that 
they were failing due to lack of strong leader who could 
match Patnaik and impress upon the High Command, stepped 
up their activity in Bhubaneswarn to induct former Chief 
Minister, Mrs. Nandini Satpathy (an independent MLA for 
the past one year) into the party and ultimately their 
faction, Mrs. Satpathy was adopting a "Barkis is willing" 
attitude for the induction while dissidents were hoping 
to gain some leverage with her entry. Dissidents started 
37. Hindustan Times (Delhi) 16, Jan. 1983. 
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a signature compaign demanding her admission into the party 
after Mrs. Satpathy was told by Mr. Kamlapati Tripathy 
that unless the proposal comes from Orissa unit of the 
party he could do nothing. On the other hand Ministerialists 
were trying hard to prevent her entry. In a memorandum 
given by them to Mr. Tripathi, AICC(I) working president, 
they argued that she was the first Chief Minister to desert 
38 
Mrs. Gandhi in 1977. 
Factionalism intensified further in the second half 
of February 1983 in the wake of Organisational election in 
the Party. On 23 February, a measure of uncertainty was 
introduced into Orissa politics when two Union Ministers 
of State from Orissa lodged a protest with the party High 
Command against the conduct of Organisational elections 
which excluded them and many senior leaders from top commi-
ttees and denied them a suitable role in the organisa-
tional set up. Mr. KP Singh DeO;,the then Union Minister 
of State for defence complained personally to the central 
party leadership that those who had been elected to the 
D.C. (I) of his home district, Dhenkanal, were the people 
39 
who had opposed him in the 1980 general elections. 
38. Patriot 3 Feb. 1983. 
39. Statesman (Delhi) 24 Feb. 1983. 
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Mr. Ram Chaadra Rath, the then Union Minister of 
State for Petrolivim, and Chemicals, had also complained 
that election to District Congress(I) Committer in the 
state had been held in a way that only people "hand-picked" 
by the Chief Minister were included in them. The dissi-
dents led by K.C. Lenka, Bipin Das, Srikanta Panda, Matlub 
Ali, Kangali Panda, Netrananda Mallick, and Lalitmohan 
Gandhi, all MLAs met on 23 Feb. Congress(I) the Working 
President Mr. Tripathi, the general Secretary Rajiv Gandhi 
Pranab Mukerjee, and the General Secretary in charge of 
Orissa Chandulal Chandrakar. They complained about the 
40 
"large-scale irregularities" in conducting the poll." 
Besides all senior Congressmen like R.C. Rath, K»P-
Singh Deo, MPs like Jagannath Rao, Laxman Mallick, S.Sahu 
and S.S. Mohapatra had been left out from the top Committees, 
It was a virtual elimination of these Patnaik detractors 
41 
or potential rivals from state scenes. It shows that 
factions try their level best to control party organisations 
down the lower rung in villages and districts. 
A significant development occured, just during this 
time, in the form of unprecedented out-brust of all SC/ST 
40. Ibid. 
41. Ibid. 
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MLA's against Mr. Patnaik. Prominent dissident tribal 
leader Hemananda Biswal provided leadership to these 
MLAs who were sore about the inaction of the Ministry in 
keeping its election promises fulfilled regarding the up-
liftment of Harijans and Adivasis. They constitute 40% 
of the total membership of the Assembly. Their joining 
hands with the dissidents caused Patnaik many a sleepless 
night and he desparately tried to win over them by his 
characteristic carrot and stick tactics. 
By March 14, situation worsened to such on extent 
that there were two PCC(I) Presidents in Orissa. Though 
Mr. Chintamani Jena, M.P. was still officially the presi-
dent of PCC(I), the actual control was exercised by 
Mr. Dambarudhar Ulaka, MLA who as Patnaik's nominee got 
himself elected just before the last minute postponement 
of the election by the party high command. Mr. Jena's 
fall from the grace, a long time Patnaik loyalist was 
sudden. One fine morning the Chief Minister summoned 
some of his tested collogues to his residence and said that 
High Command is unhappy over the functioning of Mr. Jena, 
and himself suggested the name of Mr. Ulaka and told them 
to go and file nomination paper for Mr. Ulaka. Mr. Jena 
was not consulted at any state and was kept in darkness 
42 till the last moment. 
42. Hindustan Times (Delhi) 14 March 1983. 
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The central leadership of the Congress(I) must 
share the blame for continuation of feud in the state 
unit. The manner in which the Central leadership post-
poned the organisational elections after giving a long rope 
to the Ministerial group to conduct these in whatever manner 
it liked had emboldened the dissidents who saw the postpon-
ment as cancellation of the entire process. While the dissi-
dents wa'e jubilant, the ministerial group was perplexed. The 
later group became somewhat nervous, despite its overwhel-
ming majority in the legislature party, since this cannot 
be regarded as a guarantee against a change of leadership 
The strategy of dissidents was to precipitate a crisis sit-
uation in which the High Command will be obliged to concede 
their demand for a change. This prove that the High Command 
is the ultimate arbiter of Ministry's fate and acts as a 
balancer in the power game in states. Another observation 
is that both factions want to make friends in the organisa-
tional set ups placed vertically in the party - both bellow 
and above. 
In May 12, the Congress(I) High Command issued show-
cause notices to three dissidents leaders in Orissa for 
their "anti-party" activities. The three were K.C. Lenka 
Hamandanda Biswal, and Bipin Das. AICC(I) General Secretary 
C.L. Chandrakar, who was in charge of Orissa, told newsmen 
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that the action was taken on the basis of reports from 
PCC(I) chief and the Chief Minister and the reports appe-
ared in the press. In an interesting development, Heman-
danda Biswal, as the Chairman of the public undertaking 
Committee, on March 30 ( a day before his term was to be 
over ) had indicated the Chief Minster and some officials 
on the famous mustard oil scanelal in which the state 
Government had purchased Mustard oil at a higher price 
than the prevailing price in the market. However, the 
Committee was reconstituted with Indramani Rout a patnaik 
yesman as the chairman who rejected the earlier report and 
43 decided to review the issue. It was due to this that 
Mr. Biswal was issued a show-cause notice. On June 7, 
Mr. J.B. Patnaik returned from New Delhi and announced with 
confidence that there was no question of change of leader-
44 
ship and his ministry would continue in office. 
Elections for the Orissa PCC(I) Presidentship, Vice-
Presidentship and other office-bearer was to be held on 
July 15. Dissidents had filed their nomination papers for 
almost all posts. But Mr. Dhruba Charan Sahu, Assistant 
Returning Officer and a know Patnaik-man, declared all nomi-
nation papers of dissident as invalid on flimsy grounds on 
43. Hindustan Times (Delhi) 12 May 1983, 
44. Statesman (Delhi) 8 June 1983. 
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July 13. Thereupon Mr. Gayachand Bhuyan, dissident candi-
date for the presidentship and Brajmohan Mohanty M.P. air-
dashed to New Delhi to present their case to the High Commana. 
However, Mr. Gulam Rasul Kar of Kashmir, the AiCC(I) appoint-
ed Returning Officer who reached Bhubaneswar on July 14 and 
validated all nomination papers, and declared that voting 
will be conducted on July 16 instead of July ±5. Thus the 
rebel candidates were left with no time to compaign, as they 
were in New Delhi by that time. Most dissidents including 
the Presidential candidate, Mr. Bhuyan, reached Bhubaneswar 
from Delhi, only half an hour after the election was over. 
"God alone knows what happened there. We could not appoint 
46 
even polling agents," said a young Orissa leader. 
Thirty out of 238 Congress(I) dissidents boycotted 
the election thereby giving the ministerialists a clear 
walk-over. Mr. Nityananda Mishra, MP from western Orissa. 
who was a ministerialists nominee, was elected as PCC(I) 
President defeating dissidents' nominee Gaya Chand Bhuyan 
MP by 204 to three votes. Basanta Das, a third aspirant, 
drew blank. Dambasudhar Ulaka, a ministerialist, was 
elected as Vice-President. Another ministerialist, Basanta 
45. Indian Express, 14 July 1983. 
46. Statesman, 25 July, 1983. 
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Kumar Biswal (Minister) was elected defeating Basanta Das 
by 208 to nil. All the 18 seats in the executive of the 
PCC(I) were won by Ministerialists by overwhelming majority. 
However, the 30 members elected to the AICC(I) without con-
test included two dissidents Mr. Braja Mohan Mohanty and 
47 
Mr. Basanta Das. 
Despite the strong protests lodged by party dissi-
dents, the Congress High Command approved the election 
as final. Mr. C.L. Chandrakar AICC(I) General Secretary in-
charge of Orissa, said in New Delhi on 21 July 1983, that 
"the elections are final. They are all over you 
can see that there are a couple of dissidents in the execu-
48 tive list." In it was Mr. Chandrakar who acted as a yoeman 
in favour of Mr. Patnaik in Congress Headquarter in Delhi, 
which saved Mr. Patnaik from many troubles. 
In the second half of 1983, Patnaik tried to heal 
the rift in Orissa Congress(I). In November he had two 
separate rounds of taJkes with K.C. Lenka, Mr. Nityananda 
Mishra M.P., and PCC(I) president, who till a few days ago 
49 
was a dissident himself acted as a go-between. The pro-
cess intensified before the Calcutta plenary session of 
47. Times of India 17 July 1983. 
48. Statesman 22 July 1983. 
49. Hindustan Times 11 November 1983. 
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the AICC(I) scheduled to start on 26 December 1983. The 
package deal under which the dissidents were to come to 
a compromise included ministerial berths for four promi-
nent dissidents, including Mr. Lenka, and accomodation of 
others in corporations and other statutory bodies. Mr. 
Patnaik, apprehensive of Rath's moves, swung into action, 
and under his express orders the PCC(I) released a press 
note announcing the inclusion of the Union Minister of 
State for Defence. K.P. Singh Deo and Lenka as special 
invities to PCC(I) working Committee and Dr. Krupasindhu 
Bhoi and Matlub Ali MLA, as PCC members. 
In the planary session of the AICC(I) at Calcutta, 
Orissa dissidents, 10 MPs and 25 MLAs, submitted memoran-
dum to the Prime Minister, Mrs. Gandhi and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 
on 29 December 1983 alleging a "sorry state of affairs both 
in the government and the party under the Chief Minister 
J.B. Patnaik and his coterie. The High Command assured 
51 them of a change of leadership soon. 
In February 1984, came the elections to the Panchayat 
Samiti and rift accured over the candidates. The PCC(I) 
decided to contest on party basis. A state-level Committee 
was formed under the Chairmanship of Mr. Mishra, the PCC(I) 
50. Hindustan Times 22 December 1983. 
51. Hindustan Times 31 December 1983. 
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President to select the candidates. The other members of 
the Committee were the Chief Minister, J.B. Patnaik, 
Basanta Biswal Niranjan Patnaik, kishore Chandra Patel 
and Basudev Mohapatra, all trusted and loyal ministers of 
the Chief Minister and Mr. Jagannath Patnaik, President 
of Kalahandi DDC(I). This body was the final court of 
appeal also. The most significant aspect of this Commi-
ttee was that not a single dissident leader was included 
in it. In fact, it was a clever design deviced by the 
Chief Minister, J.B. Patnaik to eliminate those partymen 
52 from rural belts who were critival of him. 
Sensing the process of elimination the leader of 
dissidents. Union Minister of state for Fertilizer and 
Chemicals, Ram Chandra Rath, reacted strongly to the Party 
executive decision. In Rath's home district of Canjam, 
his sworn enemy, Mr. Brundaban Nayak, whose name was 
recommended by the PCC(I) executive for admission into 
Congress(I) started the process of selecting Congress(I) 
candidates for Panchayat Samiti polls at the behest of 
Mr. J.B. Patnaik. Meanwhile, K.C. Lenka, the prominent 
dissident leader who had pached up with the Chief Minister 
and was co-opted to the PCC(I) executive had to face rival 
candidates in his own constituency of Choudwar in Cuttack 
district put up by Mrs. Jayanti Patnaik M.P. and wife of 
52. Hindustan Times 5 February 1983. 
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the Chief Minister. The dissidents did field up their own 
53 
candidates as independents in many constituencies. 
Mr. Dayanidhi Nayak, dissident was forced to resign 
on 11 Feb. 1984, and Somnath Rath, the speaker of the 
Assembly, was inducted to fill in the gap. This reshuffle 
was followed by Patnaik's meeting in New Delhi with the 
Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi. Mr. Nayak was touring his home 
district Kalahandi. While he was half-way through addres-
sing a public meeting near Bhawanipatna, a curior reached 
with the state plane and he was asked to return leaving 
his speach halfway. On reaching Bhubaneswar, he was taken 
straight to the Chief Minister's Office and was asked to 
resign. He prevaricated, so he was forced to resign under 
compulsion. Mr. Nayak was elected to the Assembly four 
54 times and was a cabinet minister twice. The reshuffle 
had been so made that all the key portfolios were in the 
hands of Patnaik's coterie. It was, in deed, an exercise 
to control all "money bags" portfolio and was a strategic 
55 
move in preparation for the comming general election. 
In the first week of March the one more variable 
was added in tussle between Ministrialists and dissidents. 
53. Hindustan Times 5 Feb., 1984. 
54. Hindustan Times, 12 Feb. 1984. 
55. Ibid. 
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It was over the selection of candidates for the ensuing 
Rajya Sabha poll. There wwere as many as 30 aspirants for 
the seats that to fall vacant towards the end of the 
month. ON March 4, PCC(I) executive meeting at Bhubanes-
war could not finalise the list and, to find out of the 
impose, delegated the power of selection of candidates to 
the Chief Minister. Meanwhile there were demands for 
neglected western Orissa for representation. Similarly, 
the Adivasi and Harijan legislators had demanded represen-
tation pointing out that out of four outgoing MPs one was 
56 Harijan and one Adivasi. In a memorandiim to Mrs. Gandhi 
and Mr. Rajiv Gandhi 6 MPs from western Orissa complained 
that the "Callous and indifferent" manner in which people 
of Western Orissa were being treated by the State Adminis-
tration gave impression "that a deliberate strategy has been 
formulated by the State Government to stall any progress 
in this region." The signatories were Dr. Krupasindhu Bhoi, 
Ras Behari Behera, Christoper Ekka, Narayan Sahu. Gayachand 
57 Bhuyan, and Arjun Sethi. 
In the first week of April, Bhuta Singh, Union 
Minister for works and Housing visited Orissa to ascertain 
the performance of Patnaik's Ministry. In a statement 
56. Hindustan Times (Delhi) 17 March, 1984. 
57. Statesman (Delhi) 29 April, 1984. 
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after his tour, on April 8, he said that "I am quite satis-
fied with the performance of the Orissa Government. The 
Government is doing 'Very well* Inthe task of implementa-
58 tion of revised 20 point programme. 
Ministerialists in Orissa suffered a setback in the 
re-poll (which was done after the changes of irregularities 
were upheld) to organisational election in three important 
districts of Sambalpur, Phulbani, Hemananda Biswal, a pro-
minent dissident leader, was elected as DCC(I) President 
defeating Mr. J. Pradhan, a loyalist MLA by 102 to 62 votes. 
Robi Patnaik, also a dissident, elected as the Vice-President 
In Phulbani Mr. Jagdish Jani, M.P., defeated a ministrial-
59 ist Mrutunjaya Naik, M.P. 
The factional fight, which hitherto was submerged 
under the party discipline erupted into open by unchaining 
all party norms in the month of September. On 5 September, 
S.S. Mohapatra, M.P. and a dissident leader, openly demanded 
a change of leadership after the Burla incident in which 
10 students of Regional Engineering College had died. In 
a press statement on September 12 Mr. Mohaptara flayed 
the Chief Minister again and charged his (Mr. Patnaik's) 
faction of the ruling party with "attempts to throttle the 
58. Statesman (Delhi) 9 April, 1984. 
59. Hindustan Times 23, April 1984. 
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voice of Congressmen." He also announced that he would 
tour different states to "Unmask" the administration of 
the Chief Minister, J.B. Patnaik. He demanded a "Up-type 
change" in the state. According to him, various charges 
of corruption, favouritism and the deteriorating law and 
order situation in the state made by several MPs and MLs 
were pending from long time and no action had been taken 
for the post three years. The "results of such memoranda 
has been disimissal of a minister ( a dessident ) and the 
party secretary in the Assembly." All dismissed were 
dissidents. 
The open revolt of Mohapatra had taken the Chief 
Minister and the PCC(I) Chief by surprise and he, 
upon the advice of his friends in Delhi, initiated a sig-
nature campaign among party MLAs requesting the Prime Minis-
ter to take disciplinary action against Mohapatra. Armed 
with this documents Patnaik rushed to Delhi and appraised 
of the situation in the state to the Prime Minister and 
in a press conference at his Rajpath residence he, exuding 
confidence, told pressmen that he was going to stay and 
would complete his full term. "Mr. Mohapatra is a lone 
voice," said Mr. Patnaik. To butress his point he pointed 
out to the strong statement made by the AICC(I) General 
60. Times of India (Delhi) 13 September 1984. 
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S e c r e t a r y Mrs . B a j p a i e on Sep tember 6 , s n u b i n g Mr. Mohapa t ra 
for h i s i r responsible statements. According to the CM, Mohapatra was 
saying against him because he suffered from personal prejudice against him 
(the CM). 0n .Sept. 8, AICC(I) sought explanation from 
Mohapatra for his anti-party activity. Meanwhile, Rajiv 
Gandhi gave a clean chit to the Patnaik Ministry, saying 
its performance particularly in the implementation of 
20 points programme, had widely been commended by develop-
+ 62 
mental experts. 
Defending himself, Mohapatra said that he had only 
echoed the voice of mute millions of the state and he is 
fully loyal to Mrs. Gandhi. However, the Congress High 
Command summoned to Delhi several congress leaders of 
Orissa on October 10. Some dissidents wre also summond. 
The purpose of the meeting was to "throw out intra-party 
differences threatening the ruling party's election pros-
pects in the state." However, the disciplinary Action 
Committee of the Congress(I) recommended Mohapatra's ex-
pultion from the party. On 17 November 1984, S.S.Mohapatra 
was expelled from the Congress(I) Party. Thus, master 
juggler, J.B. Patnaik, got rid of one of his long-standing 
and bitterest rival in the State politics. That Patnaik 
61. Statesman (Delhi) 8 Sept. 1984. 
62. Times of India (Delhi) 15 Sept. 1984. 
63. Times of India (Delhi) 9 October, 1984. 
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had succeeded in poisioning the ear of the High Command 
and action against Mohapatra was imminent was clear when 
the Prime Minister during his Orissa tour just a day before 
her assassination praised J.B. Patnaik and his Government 
64 for doing well and ruled out any change in the leadership. 
Mrs. Gandhi was assassinated on 31st October, 1984. 
This generated a new emotional out-brust thorughout the 
country. Congress(I), thorugh their compaigning, speeches, 
manifesto and propaganda projected 'Unity and integrity' 
of the nation as an issue before the electorate along with 
'Clean government.' All these coupled with the sympathy 
factor gave a spectocular success to Rajiv on his maiden 
appearance as leader of the party and government. With 
49.17 percent votes and 401 seats in its bag Congress(I) 
opened up a new chapter in the annals of electoral history 
In Orissa these same factors helped Congress to win all 
but one seats (it was 20 out of 21 seats). Dissidence 
during the poll to Lok Sabha was lying at its lowest ebb. 
All Congressmen unitedly fought the election. It was due 
to the travimatic experience of the nation which came in 
the form of Mrs. Gandhi's assissination and events which 
followed it. 
64. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 31 October 1984. 
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Nevertheless, there were some dissidents in the 
state who allegedly tried in vain to sabotage their poli-
tical enemies in their own party i.e. Congress(I). Thus 
on January 9, 1985. The PCC(I) executive and the presi-
dents and the Secretaries of the DCC met at Bhubaneswar 
and authorised PCC(I) president Nitya-nanda Mishra to form 
a Committee to enquire into allegation against partymen 
who were engaged in anti-party activities during the Lok 
65 Sabha elections and to recommend action against them. 
An analysis of the above disscussion shows that it 
is the High Command and especially Mrs. Gandhi and his son 
Sanjay and latter on Rajiv who were the ultimate balancing 
factors in political rivalary at various levels. Had it 
not been so, the local conflicts and dissentions would have 
shattered the party edifLc long ago. The dissidents were 
always incapable of harming the man at the top if he was 
in good book of the High Command. J.B. Patnaik successfuly 
tackled all his detractors and almost isolated them into 
political wilderness. Those who were opposed to him were 
either sacked or expelled or were forced to toe the line 
of the Chief Minister. In addition to this J.B. Patnaik 
made friends in New Delhi with heavy weights in the AICC(I) 
65. Patriot 11 January, 1985. 
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such a G.K. Moopanar, Rajindra Kumari Pranab Mukherjee 
etc., who worked for him. It was due to these factors that 
inspite of most of the M.P.*s from the state opposing his 
leadership and constantly trying to persuade the High 
Command through memoranda, he continued to hold on without 
any danger. In fact, all these memoranda proved to be 
disasterous for the dissidents themselves when it was seen 
that after each such representation the High Command gave 
a clean chit to Patnaik Ministry and to cap it all gave 
green signal to the Chief Minister to strike at the dissi-
dents to control them. 
Another observable fact is that when a leader of 
the faction persistently tries to gain some power and failed 
repeatedly in his attempts he usually either leaves the 
party or revolts openly out of frustrated hopes and blas-
ted emotions. The instance of S.S. Mohapatra is point in 
this regard. He was opposed to Nandini Satpathy and later 
on to J.B. Patnaik. Both of them effectively centred Moha-
patra due to their proximity to Mrs. Gandhi and her son. 
When Mohapatra was rising to eminence during his general 
secretaryship of the AICC(I) in 1980 exactly at this time 
Patnaik successfully clipped the wings of his over ambi-
tious rival. Subsequently, all his efforts were also 
belied by Patnaik both in Delhi as well as in Orissa Sens-
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ing that he could not succeed in his aim inspite of his 
undefatigable anti-Patnaik efforts for over four years, 
he (Mohapatra) revolted openly, knowing fully well that 
this could invite servere disciplinary action against 
him. In fact, he was mentally prepared to face the expul-
sion. This shows that when a faction leader's demand is 
disregarded for long he retreats to the point of open 
rebellion. 
Another fact to be observed is that the process of 
elimination of dissidents, if handled astutely, helps in 
putting the party legislators on their toes. Thus, J.B. 
Patnaik, during his maiden experience of state politics 
got rid of dissident leaders like K.C. Lenka, Upendra Dixit 
R.C. Ulaka, Dayanidhi Nayak and K.C. Patnaik etc. on 
different occasions, and this exercise was done under the 
name of Congress(I) High Command. This otherwise genera-
ted hope among the aspirant legislators and put the minis-
terial collogues on the right track. 
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CONCLUSION 
As a matter of fact, factionalism in Indian poli-
tics is omnipresent and mutli-dimensional phenomenon. In 
Liberal Democratic party Systems which are open and compe-
titive in nature factional conflicts are inevitable. Intra-
party groups and rivalries take many forms. It is due 
to this fanctionalism that party politics in Orissa since 
the very inception of the State has passed through several 
interesting phases. During the period under study (1975 to 
1985) the ruling parties witnessed many a crisis and clash 
of interest and/or personalities. The players changed 
sides, the rules of the game underwent alterations and stra-
tegies witnessed new dimensions. 
The hypothesis that factionalism is predominantly 
personal in nature is amply proved through analysis of 
facts in the present case study. The interest of group-
leaders had, in all cases, been the major contributing 
factor in the formation and/or disintegration of factions 
in the party. For instance, Mahtab in late fifties formed 
a faction with Biju, Biren and Nilamoni as the core members 
only to stage a comeback from his political exile in Bombay 
Raj Bhawan. Soon after he succeeded in his design, the 
faction disintegrated. Similarly, J.B. Patnaik - Ram Rath 
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faction was formed by the former only to wrest power from 
Mrs. Satpathy. And no sooner did J.B. Patnaik was made 
the CM. in 1980, he ignored the claims of his trusted 
follower Ram Rath which resulted in latter^s alienation 
from his master and subsequent emergence of Mohapatra -
Rath - Lenka faction in 1982. This also shows that faction-
leaders often side-track their hard-core followers if 
they foresee danger to their own interest or position in 
the form of possible challenge from the emerging leadership 
of their earstwhile supporters. 
Another powerful variable at the micro-level fac-
tionalism is the "psychological and sociological" factor 
which James L. Payne termed as "status inventives". It 
means a hightened need for power, prestige and the like on 
the part of an actor who enters politics primarily in pur-
suance of these basically personal ends. In the present 
study, it is difficult to come across a single faction -
leader who did not ran after these powerful motivating 
factor. In fact, the very strength and cohesiveness of a 
faction depended largely upon the ability of a leader to 
distribute material benefits and extend patronage to his 
followers. The relation between a leader and his followers 
is invariably that of give-and-take a mutual interest adjust-
ment. The leader, in return of support from his followers, 
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distributes benefits aud offers political protection or 
support to his followers who, in fact, support the leader 
in the hope of receiving patronage from him rather than 
follow any principle or ideology. The relationship is 
superficial, short-lived and amoral. Binayak Acharya 
supported Nandini Satpathy in the hope that in case of 
Biju Patnaik's defeat he would be made the leader of the 
CLP and hence the CM if a chance came. But when Mrs.Satpathy 
was imposed by the party High Command as the CM, Acharya's 
long-cherished hope was shattered and he soon started a 
tirade against her. Similarly, Ram Chandra Rath supported 
J.B. Patnaik in latter's fight against Mrs, Satpathy and 
continued to do so till he realised that he was fighting 
a lost battle and that his cause no longer being nurtured 
well by his mentor. Marry C. Carras' thesis that ideology 
or policy issues also causes factionalism does not hold 
good in the light of findings in the present study. In the 
present study the facts amply prove that personal ambitious 
and gains rather than principles and ideology have been the 
determinants of factionalism. Principle and ideology always 
get the back seat in the game of politics in India. 
Factionalism is highly fluid and fluctuating in nature. 
Members - both core and peripheral - often change sides with-
out any hesitation if they perceive that it will any way 
help achieve their desired goal. In 1972-73, Binayak Acharya, 
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S.S, Mohapatra and P.K. Bal who were allies of Mrs. Satpathy 
against the dominant faction of Biju Patnaik soon parted 
company and formed anti-Satpathy faction when she joined 
hand with Mahtab. Similarly, for some time ex-PCP men like 
S.N. Dwivedi, B.B. Das and N. Khuntia were allies of 
Mrs. Satpathy. But soon after her alliance with the CPI 
in 1974 they drifted away from her and joined the rival 
faction. In 1976, J,B, Patnaik*s faction consisted of 
K.C. Lenka and Ram Chandra Rath as the core members which 
resulted in Satpathy's down-fall. Just after J.B.Patnaik 
became the CM and the "ruling clique" with B.K. Biswal as 
the dominant figure emerged on the scence, Lenka and Rath 
turned hostile to Patnaik so much so that they became the 
leaders of dissidents. Thus, it is apparent that faction-
alism is marked by a high degree of fluidity. 
Factional conflicts at one level of the organization 
sometime tend to spread their tentacles to the other level 
too both vertically and horizontally. The State level party 
leaders, in the present case study, tried hard to gain the 
support and goodwill of the High Command and at the same 
time strove hard to control the DDC and other lower level 
institutions. In 1975 Mrs. Satpathy, tried to replace her 
men, though without success, in the Workers' Union of Para-
deep, Students Congress and State Youth Congress. These 
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abortive attempt proved fatal for her in the State poli-
tics and cost her the Chief Ministership in 1976. Simi-
larly, J.B. Patnaik, in 1983, manuevered the organisational 
elections to the DCCs and the PCC (1) to capture these 
organisation. His success in this exercise is an indepen-
dent variable which explains his continuity in power. In 
fact, mobilization of all these organisations placed hori-
zontally and down the ladder is always considered essential 
to impress up on the High Command of the vitality and in-
evitability of the leader concerned. Thus, it may be con-
cluded that with the intensification of factionalism, both 
sides compete for winning over the support of power struc-
tures placed horizontally as well as vertically both down 
and above them. It may not be out of place to mention 
here that the Congress party with its dominant position in 
the Centre and most of the States for a considerably long 
time has developed a political culture of its own. There 
is no gainsaying the fact that factionalism as an index of 
power game has acquired acceptability in Congress politi-
cal culture. Its forms did differ but the outcome did not. 
Another noticeable fact which emerges clearly from 
the study is the decisive role played by the High Command 
especially in the Congress System. A faction, regardless 
of its strength in the CLP, could easily emerge as victo-
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rious in the factional warfare if it can win the support 
of the High Command, In the tussle between Satpathy and 
Biju Patnaik, the former won although she was represen-
ting a minority faction and Biju Patnaik was in full 
command of the party organisation. But Indira Gandhi did 
not like Biju from the beginning which clinched the issue 
in Satpathy's favour. She was virtually imposed on the 
State party Organisation by Indira Gandhi in 1974. Simi-
larly, J.B. Patnaik succeeded against Satpathy only and 
exclusively due to disdain which Sanjay Gandhi harboured 
against the ex-communist Satpathy. She was sacked in 
1976, inspite of majority support to her in the CLP and 
the party in general. From 1980-85, notwithstanding all 
their indefatigable efforts, Lenka-Mohapatra faction could 
not dislodge J.B. Patnaik because he enjoyed the confidence 
of Mrs. Gandhi and later on Rajiv Gandhi and cultivated 
good relations with Congress heavy-weithts at the Centre 
such as Pranab Mukherjee, Chandulal Chandrakar, G.K. 
Moopanar, Rajendra Kumari Bajpaee etc. 
The case of strong leadership for countering fac-
tionalism in the party is generally found to be untenable. 
In case of Orissa we find a galaxy of distinguished per-
sonalities endowed with undisputed qualities of leadership. 
For example. Dr. Mahtab and Biju Patnaik were towering 
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figure with immense mass following. Dr. Mahtab was a 
seasoned politician and dynamic. Similarly, Mrs.Satpathy 
had unparalleled shrewdness in her style of functioning 
while R.N. Singh Deo, Natakantha Das etc. were just 
brilliant leaders. J,B, Patnaik, as compared to these 
figures was too small and just an emerging star. However, 
the leadership of all these stalwarts was characterised 
by the intense group fighting so much so that none of 
them could complete a full term in the office. But,strange 
as it seems, J.B, Patnaik is going to complete his second 
full term as the Chief Minister of the troublesome Orissa. 
Thus, contrary to the popular belief, strong leadership 
is no sure an antidote to factionalism. 
The view that party in power is susceptible to in-
tense factional cleavages in the absence of any effective 
and organised opposition does not hold ground with consis-
tency. Factionalism during J.B, Patnaik's first ministry 
from 1980-85 continued unabetted although the Congress 
was facing a strong opoosition with Biju Patnaik as the 
head of Janata Party. After the mid-term Assembly poll 
of 1974, Congress ministry with Satpathy as the Chief 
Minister was made possible because the CPI (which had 
seven members in the Assembly) supported her from without. 
Utkal Congress was formidable and strong having 35 members. 
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Congress was facing unprecedented external threat in 
the form of an alliance between three formidable heavy-
weights of the State viz Biju Patnaik, Dr. Mahtab and 
R.N. Singh Deo, all former CMs which was termed as 
Pragati Party. But, inspite of such external threat, 
intraparty tussle between Satpathy and ex-PSP men was 
on full swing which latter on developed into anti-CPI 
faction headed by Binayak Acharya and S.N. Dwivedi. 
Similar was the case of increasing factionalism in Lok 
Dal Ministry of Nilanony Routray during 1979-80 when 
they were facing challenge from the re-emerging Congress 
party in the State. 
A dominant party, because of its unchallenged mono-
poly of political power, patronage and financial resources 
available to it, obviously attracts to itself a wide 
variety of socio-economics interest and, thus becomes a 
haven for most disparate elements which grope, through it, 
for political recognition, articulation and control. 
J.B. Patnaik gave a stability to the State politics which 
resulted in proliferation into the Congress(I) of various 
interest groups, such as contractors and mine-workers 
lobbies, which resulted in the factional conflict between 
Biswal (representing contractors* lobby) virsus anti-
Patnaik faction led by K.C. Lenka and Ram Chandra Rath. 
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Janata Party frooi 1979-80 also provides an exam-
ple in this regard and also explains Intense 
factionalism during the Janata rule. Potentiality or 
prospect of factionalism in dominant party is more than 
in other lesser political parties. 
Another important observation is the strong possi-
bility of inter-party collaboration when factionalism in-
creases in a party. Mrs. Satpathy, due to her Communist 
background sought their support to win against her rivals 
in the party itself. It was this very motivation which 
also forced her to engineer PSP merger in the Congress. 
Another instance is clandestine support of ex-PSP men in 
the Congress to the J.P. movement in Orissa. They did 
it to hasten the downfall of Nandini government because 
they were opposed to her alliance with the CPI. Similarly, 
Biju Patnaik the leader of opposition in the Assembly 
supported dissidents who were striving hard to replace 
J.B. Patnaik. 
The role of press and media of communication e.g. 
T.V., Radio in intensification of factionalism has been 
well observed during the present study. Press and poli-
tics go hand in hand in Orissa. Every stalwart in poli-
tics in the State either owns a newspaper or has direct 
or indirect control over a newspaper. Dr. Mahtab owned 
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the Eastern Times (English) and "The Prajatantra" (Oriya). 
Mrs. Satpathy also has her own paper - Dharitri - edited 
by her husband. J.B. Patnaik's son-in-law owns and edits 
a widely circulated Oriya daily "Sambad". These newspapers 
mirrors the views attitude and perceptions of their owners. 
For example, when Mrs, Satpathy was involved in factional 
fight with the dissidents in the party in 1976, the 
Dharitri, the paper established by her, extended strong 
support to her. It not only praised and highlighted her 
bold leadership and substantial achievements, but also 
bitterly attacked the opponents. Similarly, 'Sambad' was 
used by J.B. Patnaik to boost his image and expose the 
misdeeds of dissidents leaders throughout the entire period 
of his first ministry when he was facing challenge from 
Mohapatra-Lenka-Rath faction. J.B. Patnaik also used All 
India Radio, Cuttack and Cuttack T.V. for the above-said 
purpose. This also shows that with the intersification 
of factionalism the media of mass communication got invo-
lved in it thereby tremendously increasing the flow of poli-
tical communication. 
The study suggests that factionalism in Orissa, 
transcends important socio-political categories such as 
caste, tribes etc. Only during pre-independent days caste 
was the base of factionalism. Satyabadi group was comprised 
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of BrahmLns and the anti-Satyabadi group consisted of 
Karans. But after that no such things was observed. 
Important leaders of a faction since post - independent 
period were from different castes. The wide-spread cri-
ticism that Nandini Government was Brahmin was not correct. 
The most important dissidents during that period were 
Binayak Acharya and Ram Chandra Rath, boOi Brahmins. 
Similarly, regionalism (coastal virsus western tribal 
districts) never acquired importance in the factional game 
in the State. This was primarily because the Congress 
had seldom been strong in western Orissa and hence most 
of its important leaders were from coastal districts. So 
the Congress factionalism was mostly been confined to its 
leaders from the coastal districts. 
In the light of facts, it may be concluded that, 
when a leader of a faction fail repeatedly in his endeavour 
to gain power or his hope of success in future is bleak, 
he either revolt openly against the party leadership or 
leaves the party altogether. For example, S.S. Mohapatra 
was effectively curbed first by Mrs. Satpathy and then by 
J.B. Patnaik. All his effort to cut a place in the power 
structure was sabotaged by the two former CMs. When Mohapatra 
saw that so long as J.B. Patnaik is there he had no chance 
to test real power, he openly revolted against the former 
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fully knowing that disciplinary action would be taken 
against him. In fact, he was mentally prepared to face 
the action of High Command which culminated in his expul-
tion in 1984. Similarly, in 1940s, Das - Mishra faction 
quit the Congress party, when they saw that they would 
never succeed against Mahtab. The case of Congress splits 
in Orissa in 1967 when Dr. Mahtab and his followers left 
Congress to form "Jana Congress" and again the next split 
in 1970 when Biju Patnaik and his followers left the party, 
when they were defeated in the factional conflict with 
Mrs. Satpathy faction prove the above point eloquently. 
Both the split were the result of this "demand-and-retreat" 
syndrome of faction-leaders. 
Last but not the least is the observation that the 
process of elimijiatioh of dissidents, if handled astutey, 
help putting the party-men on the right track. J.B. Patnaik, 
during his first ministry, got rid of K.C. Lenka, Upendra 
Dixit, R.C. Ulka, Dayanidhi Nayak, K.C. Patnaik etc. on 
different occasion, all done under the name of High Command, 
generated hope among aspirant and at the same time put the 
ministerial colleagues on the track. This helped him in 
curbing the dissidence in the party. 
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